State v. Montoya, 10 N.M. 656

Background

Late Oct. 10–11, 2012: Rhiannon Montoya drove Angel Baldonado and Sheanee Martinez to her uncle Rudy Montoya’s home; Baldonado and Martinez attacked and killed Rudy (multiple stab wounds and blunt trauma). Baldonado and Martinez later admitted the killing and pleaded guilty to second‑degree murder, burglary, and tampering with evidence.
Baldonado and Martinez testified at Rhiannon’s trial that Rhiannon offered money/land to induce the killing, handed Martinez a knife, drove them to Rudy’s house, waited in the car, and later aided post‑murder activity.
Police later recovered bloody clothes, a bat, and stolen property; Martinez testified she cleaned Rudy’s blood from Rhiannon’s knife in Rhiannon’s house. Officers detected strong bleach odor in Rhiannon’s home.
The jury acquitted Rhiannon of felony (first‑degree) murder but convicted her of aggravated burglary and tampering with evidence (as an accomplice).
Rhiannon appealed, arguing (1) the court improperly prevented defense counsel from defining/illustrating “reasonable doubt” during closing, (2) double jeopardy bars convicting her for both aggravated burglary and tampering with evidence because of unitary conduct, and (3) insufficiency of the evidence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether defense counsel may expand/illustrate the jury instruction defining “beyond a reasonable doubt” during closing	State: Court instruction (UJI 14-5060) is correct and must be followed; parties may not replace court’s definition	Montoya: Counsel should be allowed to explain/illustrate the standard to the jury in closing argument	Court: Trial court did not abuse discretion; parties may not deviate from or supplement UJI 14-5060 definition before the jury; counsel may apply the instruction to facts but not redefine it
Whether convictions for aggravated burglary and tampering with evidence violate double jeopardy (double‑description/multiple punishments)	State: The acts are distinct—burglary (entry while armed with intent to steal) vs. post‑burglary tampering (hiding/destroying property, cleaning the knife)	Montoya: The conduct underlying both convictions is unitary (entering with knife and removing/hiding property)	Court: No double jeopardy; conduct is not unitary—tampering occurred after burglary was complete, so separate offenses and punishments allowed
Whether accomplice testimony (Baldonado/Martinez) alone is sufficient to support aggravated burglary conviction	State: Uncorroborated accomplice testimony is legally sufficient in New Mexico	Montoya: Conviction rests almost entirely on accomplice testimony lacking physical corroboration; insufficient evidence	Court: Affirmed; New Mexico law permits conviction on uncorroborated accomplice testimony; substantial evidence supports aggravated burglary conviction
Whether evidence supports tampering with evidence conviction as to intent and assistance (accomplice liability)	State: Testimony and circumstantial evidence (knife ownership, bleach smell, cleaning admission) support intent and that Montoya helped	Montoya: Co‑defendants did not implicate Montoya as accomplice to tampering; insufficient evidence	Court: Affirmed; jury could reasonably infer intent to destroy/hide evidence and that Montoya provided the place/chemicals to clean the knife, supporting accomplice tampering conviction

Key Cases Cited

Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (Sup. Ct.) (the Constitution does not require courts to define "reasonable doubt"; if defined it must be careful)
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (Sup. Ct.) (erroneous burden‑of‑proof instruction is always prejudicial error)
State v. Garcia, 138 N.M. 1 (N.M.) (UJI 14‑5060 adequately defines "beyond a reasonable doubt" and should be used unadorned)
Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3 (N.M.) (double‑description/double jeopardy analytic framework for unitary conduct and legislative intent)
State v. Kidd, 278 P. 214 (N.M.) (an accomplice's uncorroborated testimony may be sufficient to support a conviction)