State v. Moncada
241 Or. App. 202
Or. Ct. App.2011Background
- Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of failure to perform the duties of a driver to injured persons under ORS 811.705 arising from a single October 16, 2007 accident in Coos County that resulted in the deaths of Marilyn and Dallas Vance.
- At sentencing, defendant argued the Vances were not separate victims, so the convictions should merge or, if not merged, the sentences should be concurrent.
- The trial court refused merger, treating each Vance as a separate victim, and imposed a departure sentence of 36 months with 36 months of post-prison supervision on each count; Count 4 was made consecutive to Count 3.
- The statute ORS 811.705 requires a driver to stop, remain, aid, and provide information to injured persons; the gravamen is leaving the scene without providing aid.
- The issue on appeal is whether ORS 161.067(2) merger and ORS 137.123 consecutive-sentencing rules apply when the statute does not expressly name the victim but the driver’s duties are owed to injured persons.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether convictions must merge under ORS 161.067(2). | Glaspey/ Luers support treating each injured person as a separate victim. | There was a single criminal episode; the Vances are not separate victims. | Each Vance is a separate victim; convictions not merged. |
| Whether consecutive sentences were proper under ORS 137.123. | Victims were distinct; consecutive sentences appropriate under statute. | If not merged, sentences should be concurrent; victims should not be separate. | Consecutive sentences proper; ORS 131.007 context supports separate victims for consecutive terms. |
| Whether the proper victim definition governs merger and consecutive sentencing interpretations. | Victim should reflect injured persons protected by ORS 811.705. | Victim definition should be the generic ORS 131.007 view of victims. | Victims are the injured persons owed duties; two Vances are separate victims for both merger and sentencing purposes. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Glaspey, 337 Or. 558 (2004) (victim differs by statute; test for merger depends on gravamen)
- State v. Luers, 211 Or. App. 34 (2007) (merger analysis may apply where arson-like counts involve collateral consequences)
- PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606 (1993) (establishes statutory interpretation framework for ambiguous terms)
- State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160 (2009) (contextual/textual approach to statutory interpretation in criminal issues)
- State v. Hamlett, 235 Or. App. 72 (2010) (statutory purpose of ORS 811.705 to aid injured persons and protect scene integrity)
- State v. Bassett, 234 Or. App. 259 (2010) (discusses interpretation and related merger/consecutive issues)