State v. Molinar, 1 CA-CR 16-0530

Background

Molinar was detained after a store reported a belligerent shoplifting suspect; he refused to give his name, resisted arrest, ran, and threw a punch; officers Tased and struck him before handcuffing him. Video surveillance captured the struggle.
Jury convicted Molinar of aggravated assault (reasonable apprehension), resisting arrest, shoplifting, and refusing to provide a truthful name; acquitted on touching aggravated assault; sentencing as repetitive offender to concurrent prison terms (longest five years).
Pretrial, Molinar sought: (1) prosecutor communications and recordings related to State experts on use-of-force; (2) Mesa Police "Blue Team" use-of-force reports; (3) limitations on calling officers "victims" and references to an officer’s military service; (4) exclusion of State expert testimony on use-of-force and a mistrial after contested expert testimony; and (5) challenge to a jury instruction phrasing the standard as a "reasonable officer on the scene."
The superior court denied compelled disclosure of prosecutor-expert communications as work product, denied production of Blue Team reports, allowed limited use of the term "victim," permitted brief mention of military service, admitted expert testimony about police training (but precluded opinion on the specific incident’s reasonableness), and gave the "reasonable officer on the scene" instruction.
On appeal, the court reviewed discovery rulings for abuse of discretion, constitutional/evidentiary matters de novo where implicated, and fundamental-error review for an unpreserved instructional complaint.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Molinar)	Held
1. Disclosure of prosecutor–expert communications and recordings	Communications were work product and protected from disclosure.	Once the State calls an expert, related materials (recordings/statements) must be produced; alternatively, produce redacted versions per Rules 15.4/15.5.	No abuse of discretion: record did not show existence of recordings/writings; expert testimony on use-of-force was later precluded, making such materials immaterial; work product protection sustained.
2. Disclosure of Mesa "Blue Team" reports	Reports are internal records; not material to bias/motive and protected from disclosure.	Reports would show officers’ prior use-of-force history and bear on bias/motivation to secure conviction.	Denial affirmed: prior Blue Team entries would not be probative of the officers’ bias/motive here; Cook controls limits on using prior complaints to show propensity or impeachment.
3. Use of term "victim" and reference to officer's military service at trial	Use of "victim" and brief background (military service) are permissible; victim-status acknowledgment tied to statutory victim rights; military service is relevant background.	Calling officers "victims" undermines presumption of innocence; military reference is irrelevant and prejudicial.	No reversible error: limited references did not deprive presumption of innocence; court instructed jury on victim rights and presumption of innocence; brief military reference was relevant background and not unfairly prejudicial.
4. Expert testimony on police use-of-force, mistrial motion, and jury instruction phraseology	Expert may testify about police training and factors officers consider; instruction using "reasonable officer on the scene" is appropriate under Graham.	Expert testimony improperly conveyed that officers’ force was reasonable and invaded jury province; mistrial should have been granted; instruction should reference "reasonable person" or is incomplete/misleading.	No abuse of discretion: expert testimony about training was admissible (not opinion on the specific incident); mistrial denied properly; the "reasonable officer on the scene" instruction correctly states applicable standard and did not constitute fundamental error.

Key Cases Cited

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (excessive-force reasonableness judged from perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene)
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) (work-product protection for investigator’s mental impressions and strategies)
State v. Superior Court (Cook), 132 Ariz. 374 (App. 1982) (limits on using prior complaints to show propensity or for impeachment under Rules 404(b)/608(b))
State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557 (2003) (standards for granting a mistrial and deference to trial court’s discretion)