State v. Moler, 123077

Background

Moler was stopped driving two different vehicles (a Chevrolet Silverado on March 13, 2019, and a Ford Focus on June 22, 2019); police testified they saw him drive each vehicle only once. Registration forms Moler later filed (March 19 and June 27, 2019) omitted vehicle information.
Moler stipulated at trial that he had a January 30, 2007 juvenile adjudication (aggravated criminal sodomy) that required him to register under KORA; the amended information nonetheless referred to that prior disposition as a "conviction." No other evidence of the prior adjudication was presented to the jury.
Moler argued at trial (and on appeal) that: (1) K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-4907(a)(12)’s use of "operate" requires regular or multiple use (so a one-time drive need not be registered), and (2) the charging document and instructions incorrectly used "conviction" so the stipulation to an adjudication was insufficient to prove the predicate.
Trial counsel recommended Moler stipulate to the registration requirement; Moler accepted. Moler was convicted by a jury of two counts of failing to register vehicle information and was sentenced (57 months on Count 1, concurrent 31 months on Count 2).
Posttrial Moler moved for acquittal/new trial and claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate whether his registration period had expired; the district court requested posthearing calculations and concluded Moler remained required to register. The majority affirmed convictions; one justice concurred in part and dissented on the statutory interpretation issue.

Issues

Issue	Moler (plaintiff/appellant)	State (defendant/respondent)	Held
Whether "operate" in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-4907(a)(12) requires regular or multiple driving such that a one-time use is not reportable	"Operate" requires regular or repeated driving; one-time use need not be registered	"Operate" means to drive (no temporal requirement); one-time use must be reported	Court held "operate" means to drive (no multiple-use requirement); one-time use triggers registration duty
Whether a stipulation to a juvenile adjudication suffices despite the information and jury instructions labeling the prior disposition a "conviction"	The charging document’s reference to a conviction (not an adjudication) made proof insufficient because Moler only stipulated to an adjudication	Stipulation put Moler on notice and established the predicate; any labeling error was harmless	Court held the stipulation established the required predicate; reference to "conviction" was harmless error
Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict for failing to provide vehicle info where police saw Moler drive each vehicle only once	Insufficient — State failed to prove the vehicles were owned or regularly driven by Moler	Sufficient — evidence showed Moler drove the vehicles and failed to include vehicle info when registering	Viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the State, court found sufficient evidence to convict
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for recommending the stipulation without adequately investigating Moler’s registration period	Counsel failed to investigate whether Moler’s registration requirement had expired and thus rendered a harmful stipulation	Counsel reasonably investigated (KBI letters, KASPER, discovery) and recommendation was strategic; no prejudice shown	Court held counsel’s performance was not deficient and, alternatively, Moler failed to show prejudice; claim denied

Key Cases Cited

State v. Kendall, 274 Kan. 1003 (2002) (construing "operate" in DUI statute to mean "drive")
State v. Fish, 228 Kan. 204 (1980) (similar definitional treatment of "operate")
State v. Frederick, 292 Kan. 169 (2011) (elements required for KORA failure-to-register prosecutions)
State v. Laborde, 303 Kan. 1 (2015) (defendant must be convicted of the crime charged, not a different crime tried)
State v. Bogguess, 293 Kan. 743 (2012) (a defendant's stipulation precludes disputing those stipulated facts)
State v. Butler, 307 Kan. 831 (2018) (standards for reviewing motions for new trial and ineffective assistance claims)
State v. Coones, 301 Kan. 64 (2014) (application of Strickland in Kansas criminal cases)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
State v. Ayers, 309 Kan. 162 (2019) (plain-meaning rule in statutory interpretation)
Gannon v. State, 298 Kan. 1107 (2014) (standing as a justiciability requirement)