State v. Modlin
291 Neb. 660
| Neb. | 2015Background
- Deputy stopped Nathan Modlin after observing lane crossings and signs of intoxication; Modlin failed field sobriety tests and PBT > .08. He was arrested and taken to a hospital where a phlebotomist drew blood producing a BAC of .217.
- Officer gave Modlin a “Post Arrest Chemical Test Advisement” form that stated (among other things) that refusal is a separate crime; Modlin read, signed, and said he understood the form and did not state refusal or try to prevent the draw.
- Modlin moved to suppress the blood-test result on Fourth Amendment grounds; county court denied the motion, finding Modlin had implied and actual consent; county court conviction (DUI, first offense) followed a stipulated trial on stipulated facts.
- The district court and the Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed; the Nebraska Supreme Court granted further review focused on whether the warrantless blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment given Nebraska’s implied-consent statute.
- The Supreme Court held the blood draw is a Fourth Amendment search and that voluntariness of consent must be judged by the totality of the circumstances (including the implied-consent statute); applying that test, Modlin voluntarily consented, so suppression was not required.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Modlin) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a warrantless blood draw for DUI is a Fourth Amendment search | Blood draw is a search and, without a warrant or valid exception, unconstitutional | Agreed it is a search but asserted consent exception via implied consent and Modlin’s conduct | Yes — a blood draw is a Fourth Amendment search; consent exception applied here |
| Whether Nebraska’s implied-consent statute alone supplies Fourth Amendment "consent" | Implied-consent statutory scheme does not automatically equal voluntary consent for Fourth Amendment purposes | Implied consent (driving in Nebraska) plus compliance and failure to withdraw constitutes actual consent | Implied-consent statute is a relevant factor but not dispositive; courts must assess actual voluntariness under the totality of circumstances |
| Whether Modlin’s signing/reading the advisement while warned of criminal/admin consequences rendered consent involuntary | The statutory penalty/coercive choice made submission involuntary or coerced | Advising about consequences does not make a resulting voluntary choice involuntary; difficult choices occur in criminal process | Advisement of consequences does not, by itself, render consent involuntary; totality of circumstances governs |
| Whether Modlin objectively withdrew consent or merely submitted to authority | Modlin contends he never consented and only complied; silent acquiescence is not true consent | Modlin’s signing, reading, affirmative responses, and passive allowance of the blood draw objectively manifested consent; no unequivocal withdrawal | No withdrawal found; silence and permitting the draw constituted objective manifestation of consent under the circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (recognizes blood draws as searches subject to Fourth Amendment)
- Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (medical intrusions are searches under Fourth Amendment)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (natural dissipation of alcohol does not create a per se exigency; exigency is case-specific)
- State v. Wells, 290 Neb. 186 (2015) (warrantless searches are per se unreasonable except for recognized exceptions)
- State v. Tucker, 262 Neb. 940 (2001) (consent must be free and unconstrained; mere submission insufficient)
- State v. Hedgcock, 277 Neb. 805 (2009) (voluntariness of consent is a legal question judged from totality of circumstances)