State v. Mobley, 296 Ga. 876

Background

On July 7, 2009, Ricci Mobley shot and killed Bryan Tinch after a public altercation; Mobley admitted the shooting but contested its legal characterization.
Mobley was indicted on multiple counts including felony murder, aggravated assault, and weapons offenses; at trial the jury convicted him of felony murder and related counts but acquitted on malice murder.
At trial defense counsel pursued justification as the principal theory and alternatively sought a voluntary manslaughter instruction; they also requested and obtained a jury charge on mutual combat.
On post-trial motion the trial court found counsel ineffective for requesting the mutual combat charge (concluding no evidentiary basis that Tinch was armed), reasoning that the charge impaired Mobley’s justification defense and granted a new trial.
The State appealed; the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, holding Mobley failed to prove deficient performance under Strickland because requesting mutual combat was a reasonable strategic choice that could aid an alternative manslaughter theory.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel performed deficiently by requesting a mutual-combat jury charge	Mobley: No evidentiary basis for mutual combat; requesting it was objectively unreasonable and impaired his justification defense	State: Requesting mutual combat was a reasonable tactical decision to secure voluntary manslaughter as an alternative	Court: No deficient performance — asking for mutual combat was a reasonable strategic move given alternative theories
Whether the mutual-combat charge prejudiced the defense (Strickland prejudice prong)	Mobley: The charge likely affected the verdict because it burdened justification in a close case	State: Because counsel’s performance was not deficient, prejudice need not be reached; alternatively, charge had both costs and benefits	Court: Did not reach prejudice after finding no deficient performance
Whether mutual combat instruction required proof that the deceased was armed with a deadly weapon	Mobley: Trial court below thought mutual combat required deadly-weapon evidence	State: Georgia law is unsettled; the instruction given did not require a weapon, so jury could find mutual combat from conduct	Court: Declined to resolve the statewide conflict; observed the instruction used did not impose a deadly-weapon requirement
Whether justification was the sole defense at trial	Mobley: Trial court below treated justification as sole defense to show impairment	State: Record shows counsel also argued provocation/voluntary manslaughter as fallback	Court: Trial court erred — justification was principal but not exclusive; voluntary manslaughter was advanced as alternative

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishing deficient-performance and prejudice standard for ineffective-assistance claims)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (deference to trial counsel decisions; perspective of counsel at time of conduct)
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (standards for ineffective assistance review)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (prejudice inquiry under Strickland)
White v. State, 287 Ga. 713 (noting conflict in Georgia law whether mutual combat requires deadly weapons)
Davis v. State, 296 Ga. 126 (trial strategy and jury-charge requests fall within tactical decisions)