State v. Mitchell
323 P.3d 69
Ariz. Ct. App.2014Background
- Police suspected Mitchell of drug trafficking after informants reported purchases and surveillance showed him driving a Kia Sportage owned by C.W.
- Without a warrant and without C.W.’s knowledge, a deputy surreptitiously attached a GPS tracker to the Kia’s undercarriage on May 5 and periodically removed/replaced it; it transmitted location data through May 30.
- On May 30 GPS alerts led deputies to intercept the Kia at Mitchell’s residence; Mitchell and the owner refused consent to search, a drug dog alerted, and officers found methamphetamine and marijuana in the vehicle.
- Mitchell was indicted and moved to suppress evidence, arguing the warrantless GPS installation and tracking were an unconstitutional search; the trial court denied suppression for lack of standing and reliance on pre-Jones precedent.
- After the Supreme Court decided Jones, Mitchell renewed suppression; the trial court again denied, and a jury convicted him on drug and paraphernalia counts.
- On appeal the Arizona Court of Appeals held Mitchell had standing, the GPS placement/use was an unlawful Fourth Amendment search under Jones, and the exclusionary rule applied to suppress the fruits of the search; convictions were reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mitchell) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to challenge GPS trespass | Mitchell argued he had standing because he lawfully possessed the Kia on the day of interception and was the target of surveillance, and the GPS constituted a continuing trespass | State argued Mitchell lacked standing because he did not possess or own the car when the device was installed; only the owner could challenge installation | Court held Mitchell had standing because lawful possession during the device’s continued presence created a continuing trespass and conferred standing |
| Whether GPS installation/use was a Fourth Amendment search | Mitchell argued Jones made warrantless installation and monitoring a search because it was a physical trespass onto an effect used to obtain information | State conceded a trespass occurred but relied on Knotts/Karo and pre-Jones precedent to argue no search or no violation | Court held Jones controls: the physical intrusion and use of the GPS to obtain location data was a Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant |
| Application of exclusionary rule / good-faith exception | Mitchell argued exclusionary rule applies and evidence is fruit of unlawful search | State invoked Davis good-faith exception, claiming reliance on existing appellate precedent (e.g., Ninth Circuit decisions, Knotts/Cramer) justified warrantless action | Court rejected good-faith claim: no binding Arizona or Supreme Court authority authorized trespassory GPS placement; exclusionary rule applies and evidence was fruit of the unlawful search |
| Necessity of warrant prior to attaching GPS | Mitchell contended warrant or owner consent was required before intruding on vehicle | State argued precedent permitted similar surveillance or was at least unsettled | Court held warrant required absent owner consent; officers should have sought judicial authorization before affixing tracker |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (U.S. 2012) (installation and use of GPS on a vehicle is a Fourth Amendment search under a trespass theory)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (U.S. 1967) (reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test for Fourth Amendment searches)
- United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (U.S. 1983) (use of a beeper to track movements considered under different facts; did not address physical-trespass GPS placement)
- Karo v. United States, 468 U.S. 705 (U.S. 1984) (tracking device placed with owner consent; distinguished from nonconsensual trespass)
- Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (U.S. 2011) (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule when officers reasonably rely on binding precedent)
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1963) (exclusionary rule bars admission of evidence that is fruit of unlawful search)
