State v. Milton, A-16-289

Background

On April 3, 2015, two Omaha Police gang‑unit officers saw a Chrysler parked about 3 feet from the curb on a one‑way street; Javaris Milton entered the rear seat as officers approached.
Officers recognized Milton as a convicted felon from prior contacts; they stopped the vehicle for an apparent parallel‑parking violation and to contact occupants.
Officers blocked the car, observed Milton make furtive movements, saw him push a metal object under the driver’s seat with his foot, ordered him out, and recovered a firearm partly protruding under the driver’s seat.
A pat‑down of Milton produced a bag of crack cocaine; Milton was charged with possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person and possession of a controlled substance.
Milton moved to suppress, arguing the stop and his seizure were unlawful; he also moved to exclude gang‑unit testimony and sought a specific jury instruction defining possession. The district court denied suppression, allowed limited gang‑unit testimony, refused Milton’s proposed possession instruction, and a jury convicted him on both counts.
On appeal Milton challenged (1) denial of the suppression motion, (2) admission of testimony that officers were in the gang unit/that he was affiliating with others, and (3) refusal to give his possession instruction; the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Milton's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Were the vehicle stop and subsequent seizure lawful?	The officers unlawfully seized the Chrysler and Milton without reasonable suspicion; the car was merely stopped briefly to pick up a passenger (no parking violation).	Officers had probable cause to stop for a municipal parallel‑parking violation; blocking exits and securing occupants during checks was reasonable for officer safety.	Stop was lawful because officers reasonably believed a parking violation occurred; blocking exits and detaining Milton during checks did not unlawfully seize him.
Does Milton have standing to challenge the stop/search?	(Implicit) He lacked a possessory interest so could not challenge the stop.	As an occupant of the car, Milton had a legitimate expectation of privacy and standing.	Milton was an occupant and has standing to challenge the seizure.
Was testimony that officers were in the gang unit and that Milton was affiliating with others unduly prejudicial?	Gang/unit evidence would unfairly prejudice the jury and imply guilt by association.	Testimony explained officers' presence, training, and familiarity with the area; no testimony established Milton’s gang membership.	Trial court did not abuse discretion: limited gang‑unit testimony was relevant and not substantially more prejudicial than probative.
Did the trial court err in refusing Milton's proposed jury instruction on "possession"?	The requested instruction was a correct statement of law and necessary to show fleeting contact did not constitute possession.	The court’s instruction followed Nebraska Jury Instructions and adequately required knowledge and control.	No prejudicial error: the jury instructions, read together, covered the law; refusal to give Milton’s specific phrasing was not reversible error.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Hill, 288 Neb. 767 (discusses standard of review for suppression and Fourth Amendment questions)
State v. Giessinger, 235 Neb. 140 (occupant of a vehicle has standing to challenge a stop)
State v. Lee, 265 Neb. 663 (traffic violations, even minor, create probable cause to stop)
State v. Rask, 294 Neb. 612 (discusses occupant control and expectation of privacy in vehicles)
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (officer's subjective intent irrelevant when probable cause for a traffic stop exists)