State v. Millerton
26 N.E.3d 317
Ohio Ct. App.2015Background
- Police observed James Millerton walking in the middle of a narrow residential street (no sidewalk/shoulder) and stopped him for jaywalking on May 12, 2013.
- Officer Phillips exited the cruiser, ordered Millerton to stop; the officer then held Millerton by the arm and performed a pat-down.
- Officer Phillips testified the pat-down was done because the area was a high-crime area; he admitted no articulable facts (furtive movements, bulging pockets, etc.) suggesting Millerton was armed.
- During the encounter (per the trial court’s factual findings) the officer asked if Millerton had weapons while Millerton was in custody and before any Miranda warnings; Millerton then admitted having a knife and a gun.
- Officer Phillips retrieved the weapons, handcuffed and arrested Millerton; Miranda warnings were given afterward.
- The trial court suppressed all evidence, finding (1) the jaywalking ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and thus provided no lawful basis to stop Millerton, (2) the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry frisk, and (3) Milerton was in custody and interrogated without Miranda. The State appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Millerton) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of jaywalking stop given ordinance vagueness | Officer reasonably believed Millerton jaywalked; officer may assume ordinance validity | Ordinance vague; stop therefore lacked lawful basis | Court: Officer may assume ordinance validity for assessing reasonable suspicion; stop could be objectively supported by officer’s belief, but this did not resolve suppression because of frisk issue |
| Whether officer had reasonable suspicion to frisk for weapons | High-crime area + defendant’s conduct justified protective frisk | No articulable facts specific to Millerton indicating danger; high-crime area alone insufficient | Court: No — facts did not support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that Millerton was armed and dangerous; frisk was impermissible |
| Whether statements and seized evidence are tainted by the pat-down | Even if frisk occurred, defendant’s admissions and recovered items were valid evidence | Evidence was obtained after an impermissible search and is therefore tainted | Court: Evidence tainted by unlawful frisk; suppression proper |
| Custody/Miranda — was Miranda required before asking about weapons? | Officer’s questions were part of a lawful investigatory detention or consensual encounter; not custodial interrogation | Defendant was seized and in custody when questioned and was not Mirandized | Court: Found Millerton was seized and pat-down occurred before Miranda; but primary basis for suppression was lack of reasonable suspicion for frisk (Miranda issue noted); suppression affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes investigatory stop and limited weapons frisk standard)
- Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (officers may assume validity of statutes they enforce)
- Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014) (reasonable mistakes of law can support a stop)
- State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86 (1991) (Terry frisk limited to protective search when officer reasonably suspects suspect is armed)
- State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405 (1993) (protective search purpose is officer safety; scope limited)