State v. Miller, 369 N.C. 658

Background

North Carolina amended its Controlled Substances Act effective Dec. 1, 2013, making it a Class H felony for a person with a prior methamphetamine conviction to possess a pseudoephedrine product (N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c)).
Before the change, adults could lawfully buy limited quantities of pseudoephedrine OTC; the statute later restricted a subset of felons from possessing such products.
Defendant (Miller) had prior convictions for methamphetamine-related offenses; on Jan. 5, 2014 he purchased an OTC pseudoephedrine product and was later indicted under the new statute.
Miller moved to declare § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) unconstitutional as applied, arguing (1) Lambert-based due process notice grounds — he lacked notice that previously lawful conduct became criminal — and (2) that a scienter requirement (knowledge of illegality) should be read into the statute.
The trial court convicted Miller; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the statute unconstitutional as applied absent notice or proof the defendant knew his possession was unlawful. The State appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Miller)	Held
Whether § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) is unconstitutional as applied under Lambert for lack of notice	Lambert exception is narrow and applies only to "wholly passive" failures to act; Miller committed an affirmative act (purchase/possession) so general rule ignorance of law no excuse applies	Miller lacked notice that a newly-enacted law (effective ~1 month earlier) criminalized previously lawful purchase; due process requires notice or proof of awareness	Reversed Court of Appeals: Lambert does not apply because Miller’s conduct was active (purchase/possession), not a wholly passive failure to act; no as-applied due process violation found
Whether a scienter or knowledge-of-illegality element must be read into § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) to satisfy due process	Statute does not require knowledge of illegality beyond the ordinary possession elements; importing scienter is unnecessary and was not preserved for Supreme Court review	Due process (Lambert/Morissette/Liparota) requires scienter or actual/probable notice when innocent conduct is newly criminalized	Not decided on the merits by the Supreme Court: statutory-construction/ mens rea issue was not preserved for review, so Court did not read a scienter element into the statute
Whether possession offenses inherently require knowledge of the nature of the substance	State: possession crimes require knowing control and knowledge of identity of the substance; that suffices	Miller: even if he knew the substance, he lacked notice that possession was illegal for him specifically	Court: possession requires knowledge of substance identity and control; Miller admitted he knew he possessed pseudoephedrine and had prior conviction, so possession elements met
Proper scope of Lambert exception post-Bryant	State: Bryant narrows Lambert to failures to act or omissions under circumstances where a reasonable person should inquire; Lambert is a narrow exception	Miller: Lambert should focus on whether circumstances would put a reasonable person on notice to inquire, not merely on active vs. passive act	Court: Adopted Bryant’s framing — Lambert is narrow; because Miller’s conduct was active, Lambert does not apply

Key Cases Cited

Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (U.S. 1957) (limited due-process exception when purely passive conduct is criminalized without notice)
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (U.S. 1985) (statutory-construction cases about whether a scienter term requires awareness of illegality)
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (U.S. 1952) (presumption of mens rea for traditional common-law crimes)
State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554 (N.C. 2005) (applies Lambert narrowly; defendant must show conduct was "wholly passive" and lack of probable notice)
Galaviz-Torres v. State, 368 N.C. 44 (N.C. 2015) (possession offenses require knowledge of identity of the substance)