State v. Michael R. Luedtke
2015 WI 42
Wis.2015Background
- This is a consolidated review of two WI Court of Appeals decisions (Luedtke and Weissinger) about destruction of blood samples before defendants could retest.
- Luedtke was charged with OVI/substances and a detectable amount of cocaine in blood; Weissinger with injury by vehicle and detectable THC in blood.
- Laboratory destroyed Luedtke's blood sample Feb. 4, 2010, before notice of charges or retest, after initial testing and prior to trial.
- Weissinger's blood sample was destroyed April 2010, after test results were mailed but before she could retest and before charges were filed.
- Courts held routine destruction did not violate due process under Wisconsin or federal law; samples were not shown to be apparently exculpatory or destroyed in bad faith.
- Statute Wis. Stat. § 346.63(l)(am) (detectable amount of restricted substance in blood) was held a strict liability offense and constitutional.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wisconsin due process provides greater protection than federal law for lost/destroyed evidence | Luedtke/Weissinger argued Wisconsin constitution protects more. | State argues Wisconsin matches US Youngblood rule; no greater protection. | Wisconsin does not provide greater protection; Youngblood controls. |
| Whether destruction of the blood samples violated due process under Youngblood | Destroyed samples could be exculpatory or destroyed in bad faith. | Destruction was in routine practice; not bad faith or apparently exculpatory. | No due process violation; routine destruction permissible. |
| Whether the loss of the samples required a jury instruction on potential exculpatory value | Should have permitted inference that lost evidence favored defense. | Not required; no exculpatory value shown, and fair trial ensured by other safeguards. | No mandatory exculpatory-inference instruction; not required. |
| Whether Wis. Stat. § 346.63(l)(am) is a strict liability offense | Criminal intent should be required; statute may punish unknowingly having substance. | Statute does not include scienter; should be strict liability. | statutory elements impose strict liability. |
| Whether Wisconsin substantive due process supports the strict-liability approach | Strict liability may violate substantive due process. | Rational basis supports public safety; no due process violation. | Statute passes rational-basis scrutiny; constitutional. |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (controls due process in evidence-destruction cases)
- Greenwold II, 189 Wis. 2d 59 (Ct. App. 1994) (Wisconsin due-process standard mirrors Youngblood)
- Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d 451 (1984) (limits requiring retention of all test samples for due process)
- Disch, 119 Wis. 2d 461 (1984) (due process realm careful about retention of samples)
- Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) (retention of samples not always required if destruction in good faith)
- Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143 (2005) (Wisconsin Constitution broader in showups context)
- Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86 (2005) (independent Wisconsin constitutional interpretation cautions federal import)
- Weissinger, 355 Wis. 2d 546 (2014) (dissent endorsing curative-instruction approach to lost evidence)