State v. Michael K. Fermanich, 991 N.W.2d 340

On September 30, 2017, Michael Fermanich stole three trucks in Langlade County and was arrested in Oneida County after driving the third truck across the county line.
Oneida County filed five charges; a $10,000 cash bond was set and Fermanich remained jailed in Oneida for 433 days. Langlade County later filed three charges and imposed a $10,000 signature bond (he was free on the Langlade charges).
The cases were consolidated in Langlade County; Fermanich pled no contest to three counts (one Langlade, two Oneida); the remaining five counts (three from Oneida) were dismissed and read in at sentencing.
The circuit court ultimately imposed concurrent sentences on the three convictions and awarded 433 days' sentence credit on all three counts; the court of appeals reversed the award as to the Langlade count.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that under State v. Floyd the 433 days in Oneida custody must be credited against the Langlade sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Fermanich is entitled to sentence credit on the Langlade County conviction for time he spent jailed in Oneida County.	State: No — custody was for Oneida charges and Fermanich was free on a Langlade signature bond; credit already applied to Oneida convictions.	Fermanich: Yes — pretrial confinement on dismissed/read‑in Oneida charges relates to the Langlade sentence (Floyd); or alternatively the whole episode was a single "course of conduct."	Court: Yes — reversed COA; under Floyd pretrial confinement on dismissed/read‑in charges relates to an offense for which defendant is ultimately sentenced; award of 433 days credit to Langlade count affirmed.
Proper scope of the phrase "course of conduct" in Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) and whether Floyd should be overruled.	State (and dissent perspective): Floyd is erroneous or inapplicable here — statute text limits credit to custody connected to the specific offense(s) sentenced; read‑in charges are not separate sentences.	Fermanich and concurrence: Floyd controls here; concurrence also suggests the statute's text supports credit when offenses are part of the same factual course of conduct.	Court: Did not overrule Floyd; applied Floyd as controlling precedent to grant credit. The concurrence urged a textual approach favorable to Fermanich but the majority resolved the case on Floyd; a dissent would have overruled Floyd.

State v. Floyd, 232 Wis. 2d 767 (2000) (holds pretrial confinement on a dismissed and read‑in charge relates to the offense for which the offender is ultimately sentenced and may be credited)
State v. Straszkowski, 310 Wis. 2d 259 (2008) (clarifies that read‑in charges are not necessarily admissions and narrows language from earlier cases)
State ex rel. Thorson v. Schwarz, 274 Wis. 2d 1 (2004) (interprets "course of conduct" narrowly as the specific offense or acts for which sentence is imposed)
State v. Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d 86 (1988) (examines legislative history of § 973.155 and its alignment with federal/model statutes)
State v. Tuescher, 226 Wis. 2d 465 (Ct. App. 1999) (court of appeals decision adopting a narrow reading of "course of conduct" as the specific acts underlying the sentenced offense)