State v. Merhege, 2017 NMSC 16

At ~3:40 a.m. Officer Lem chased two persons who ran across the front yard of 901 S. Main; one climbed a chain‑link fence and a wooden divider into the back yard; Merhege attempted the same, got entangled, and was arrested nearby.
The front yard was enclosed by a three‑foot brick wall along the street; there was a pedestrian path to the front door; no "no trespassing" signs or postings were present.
The homeowner, Gary Watkins, was unaware of the entry until informed by police weeks later and had never met Merhege.
Merhege was convicted by a jury of criminal trespass; the Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that unposted property gives the general public presumptive permission to enter and the State therefore failed to prove knowledge that consent was denied.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on whether unposted land is presumptively open to the public and whether the evidence supported a finding that Merhege knew he lacked permission.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the conviction, holding that no presumption of public permission applies to unposted land and that circumstantial evidence (fencing, time of entry, purpose to evade) supported the jury’s finding of knowledge.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the general public is presumptively granted permission to enter unposted private land	State: No presumption; entry without posting must be assessed by circumstances	Merhege: Lack of statutory posting at vehicular access implies public permissive access	Held: No presumption — permission depends on circumstances and evidence of knowledge under §30‑14‑1(B)
Whether evidence was sufficient to prove Merhege knew consent was denied	State: Yes — three‑foot wall, night entry (~3:40 a.m.), and furtive flight to evade police provided circumstantial proof	Merhege: Insufficient — property unposted and no explicit warnings, so no proof he knew entry was forbidden	Held: Yes — substantial circumstantial evidence supported jury’s finding of knowledge; conviction reinstated

State v. McCormack, 101 N.M. 349, 682 P.2d 742 (N.M. Ct. App.) (upholding trespass conviction where signs and warnings were present)
State v. Foulenfont, 119 N.M. 788, 895 P.2d 1329 (N.M. Ct. App.) (noting climbing over a fence can constitute trespass)
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (U.S. 2013) (discussing background social norms and implied license to enter property)
State v. Duran, 126 N.M. 60, 966 P.2d 768 (N.M. Ct. App.) (circumstantial evidence, repeated intrusions, and warnings can prove knowledge element)
State v. Sutphin, 107 N.M. 126, 753 P.2d 1314 (N.M. 1988) (standard for substantial‑evidence review in criminal cases)
State v. Cada, 923 P.2d 469 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (furtive pre‑dawn intrusion supports finding of trespass)
Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir.) (interpretive discussion of mens rea language in §30‑14‑1(B))