State v. Merhege, 34,775

Around 3:40 a.m., Officer Lem pursued two individuals who fled; they cut across the front yard of 901 S. Main. One escaped; Trevor Merhege became entangled on a chain-link fence while attempting to jump into the back yard and was arrested.
The front yard was enclosed by a three‑foot brick wall along the street; there was an access path to the front door. No "no trespassing" signs or other postings were present.
The property owner (Watkins) did not know Merhege and learned of the intrusion only when the police informed him weeks later.
Merhege was convicted by a jury of criminal trespass; the Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that unposted property presumptively grants the public permission to enter.
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari on the narrow question whether the general public is presumptively granted permission to enter unposted lands, and whether the evidence supported Merhege’s conviction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether unposted private land is presumptively open to the general public (i.e., lack of posting = presumed consent)	State: statute does not create a presumption of public consent; posting at vehicular access is one means of constructive notice but not exclusive.	Merhege: lack of statutory posting at vehicular access means public (including defendant) presumptively had permission to enter.	Court: No presumption; permission depends on circumstances of the individual entry.
Whether evidence sufficed to prove defendant knew he lacked permission to enter unposted land	State: circumstantial evidence (fencing, time of entry, furtive flight to evade police) supported jury inference of knowledge.	Merhege: insufficient evidence of knowledge because land was unposted and wall was only three feet high.	Court: Substantial circumstantial evidence supported conviction—fence, time (3:40 a.m.), and evasive purpose justified jury finding of knowing trespass.

State v. Duran, 126 N.M. 60, 966 P.2d 768 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (knowledge element may be proved by sufficient circumstantial evidence)
State v. McCormack, 101 N.M. 349, 682 P.2d 742 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (conviction sustained where signs/warnings and barricades put entrants on notice)
State v. Sutphin, 107 N.M. 126, 753 P.2d 1314 (N.M. 1988) (standard for substantial-evidence review)
State v. Trujillo, 131 N.M. 709, 42 P.3d 814 (N.M. 2002) (deference to jury factfinding)
State v. Foulenfont, 119 N.M. 788, 895 P.2d 1329 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (unauthorized entry by climbing fence can support trespass conviction)
State v. Laguna, 128 N.M. 345, 992 P.2d 896 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (discussed in relation to mens rea precedent)
Holcomb v. Rodriguez, 387 P.3d 286 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016) (Section 30-14-6 sets posting standard for posted land analysis)