State v. Melton, 2018 Ohio 4699

In Feb. 1996 Andre Melton pleaded guilty to aggravated murder with a mass-murder capital specification and a firearm specification; a three-judge panel accepted the plea and orally sentenced him to "twenty full years to life" plus three years for the firearm spec; the prosecutor had agreed not to seek death.
Melton repeatedly sought to withdraw his plea and pursued multiple direct and delayed appeals over years; most claims were dismissed for failure to file records or as untimely/res judicata.
In 2007–2009 the trial court entered a nunc pro tunc entry to reflect the oral sentence as "20 full years to life, consecutive to [three] year actual;" that entry initially was signed by one judge, later corrected and signed by a three-judge panel after remand.
Melton continued to challenge the form and legality of his sentence, arguing the statutory phrase was "life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty full years" and that the court instead imposed an unauthorized sentence of "20 full years to life."
In Dec. 2017 Melton filed a motion to vacate an unauthorized sentence; the trial court denied it, and he appealed. The Eighth District affirmed, holding Melton’s sentence was an indefinite sentence consistent with pre–S.B.2 law and therefore not contrary to law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Melton’s sentence is unauthorized/contrary to statute	State: sentence previously affirmed; res judicata bars re-litigation	Melton: court imposed "20 full years to life" rather than statutory "life with parole eligibility after 20 full years," so sentence is void	Court: sentence is not contrary to law; res judicata bars further review
Whether sentencing language converted an indefinite sentence into a de facto definite sentence	State: sentence as entered matches oral indefinite term	Melton: wording made it a definite 20‑year term with parole, exceeding authority	Court: unlike Kemp/Duncan, Melton already received an indefinite sentence; no improper conversion
Whether sentencing errors can be attacked collateral to direct appeal when sentence is contrary to law	State: prior affirmance prevents collateral relief	Melton: claims fall within exceptions where void sentences can be attacked anytime	Court: agrees generally that void sentences can be attacked, but finds sentence here not void
Whether nunc pro tunc corrections were proper and resolved Melton’s claims	State: nunc pro tunc order reflected oral sentence and was properly signed by three judges after remand	Melton: original entry lacked required forms and later corrections were invalid	Court: nunc pro tunc correction (signed by three judges) was proper; remaining claims barred or without merit

State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403, 71 N.E.3d 234 (2016) (distinguishes void sentences from ordinary sentencing errors; sentencing contrary to law may be attacked anytime)
State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 942 N.E.2d 332 (2010) (trial courts must impose only sentences authorized by statute)
Colegrove v. Burns, 175 Ohio St. 437, 195 N.E.2d 811 (1964) (court has no power to substitute a sentence different from that provided by statute)
State v. Thomas, 111 Ohio App.3d 510, 676 N.E.2d 903 (1996) (judges are duty‑bound to apply sentencing laws as written)
Yonkings v. Wilkinson, 86 Ohio St.3d 225, 714 N.E.2d 394 (1999) (statutory construction: words taken in their usual meaning; "definite" versus "indefinite" sentence meaning)
State v. S.R., 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 589 N.E.2d 1319 (1992) (statutory interpretation principles cited for sentencing analysis)