State v. Meek, 338 P.3d 767

Defendant and M dated; after breakup defendant sent numerous messages and on one occasion waited at M’s house; M obtained a stalking protective order (SPO) in Feb 2011 prohibiting contacts including "sending or making written communications in any form" and "delivering directly or through a third person any object" to M’s home.
On Dec 12, 2011 defendant mailed a signed, apologetic letter to M’s residence; M received it Dec 15 and reported it to police; defendant admitted sending the letter.
State charged defendant with (Count 1) violating the SPO (ORS 163.750) and (Count 2) contempt of court (ORS 33.065); original information alleged a written communication, but the amended information alleged delivering "an object" to M’s home through a third person for both counts.
At trial the only evidence of delivery was the physical letter and its envelope; no evidence anything else was delivered and the state presented no proof that the letter created "reasonable apprehension" of personal safety.
Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal arguing a letter is a "written communication" triggering the additional element of reasonable apprehension under ORS 163.750(1)(c); the state argued a letter is also an "object," so the apprehension element did not apply; trial court denied the motions and convicted; defendant appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a mailed letter is an "object" under ORS 163.730(3)(k) (so that ORS 163.750(1)(c) does not require proof of reasonable apprehension)	A letter is tangible and thus qualifies as an "object," so the state may prosecute on that theory without proving reasonable apprehension	A letter is a "written communication" under ORS 163.730(3)(d), so the statute requires proof that it created reasonable apprehension; treating letters as "objects" would nullify the communicative category and undercut constitutional safeguards	A letter is a "written communication," not an "object," for purposes of ORS 163.750(1); the state’s amended charging theory (object delivery) failed because only a letter was delivered, so acquittal was required
Whether the amended information alleging delivery of an "object" was supported by evidence at trial	The envelope and letter are tangible items satisfying the "object" allegation	Only a communicative item (a letter) was delivered; without proof of any noncommunicative item or reasonable apprehension, the object theory is unsupported	The evidence did not prove delivery of any "object" apart from a written communication; thus the amended information was not supported and conviction reversed

Gaines v. State, 346 Or 160 (statutory interpretation methodology and legislative intent) (court referenced as State v. Gaines in opinion)
Rangel v. State, 328 Or 294 (constitutional concerns regarding restrictions on speech) (referenced for context on speech-related limits)
PGE v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 317 Or 606 (statutory construction principles) (use of legislative intent and contextual reading)
Newell v. State, 238 Or App 385 (different statutory terms ordinarily have different meanings) (rule on distinct terms implying distinct meanings)
Crystal Communications, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 353 Or 300 (statutory construction to give effect to all provisions) (no surplusage rule)
State v. Buchalski, 264 Or App 142 (upholding convictions where civil complaint delivered to victim treated as object) (distinguished on facts; did not resolve written communication vs object issue)
Pete’s Mountain Homeowners v. Oregon Water Resources, 236 Or App 507 (favoring constitutional construction when alternatives exist) (applies rule favoring interpretation avoiding constitutional problems)