State v. Medina
355 P.3d 108
| Or. | 2015Background
- Defendant stopped for speeding, gave a false name ("Sergio Molina") and false DOB, had no ID, and was arrested for failure to present a license.
- At the station, defendant signed a fingerprint card and a property receipt with the name "Sergio Molina."
- AFIS later matched the prints to Emilio Medina; defendant admitted the given name and DOB were fictitious and was on probation with a possible warrant.
- Indictment charged four counts including identity theft: obtaining/possessing/transferring/creating/uttering or converting to one’s own use the personal identification of another with intent to deceive or defraud.
- Trial on stipulated record; defendant moved for judgment of acquittal arguing (1) no intent to deceive and (2) he neither "uttered" nor "converted to his own use" the documents; court denied motion, convicted, Court of Appeals affirmed in part; Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the identity-theft conviction.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Medina's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether using a false name to sign police-created documents can satisfy the statute's mental-state element "intent to deceive" | 2001 amendment adding "intent to deceive" broadened statute to cover any deception to obtain an unwarranted advantage (e.g., avoid arrest) | 1999 statute targeted "intent to defraud" (financial gain); 2001 amendment did not necessarily make mere false ID to police a crime | Held: "Intent to deceive" includes causing an officer to believe a false identity; circumstantial intent to avoid arrest suffices |
| Whether signing the fingerprint card/property receipt constituted "uttering" another's personal identification | Signing and presenting the documents amounted to uttering or converting the other's personal identification | Signing alone (on documents created and tendered by police) is not "uttering" under forgery/utter context | Held: No reasonable factfinder could find "utter" here; signing documents tendered by police is not issuance/delivery/circulation by defendant |
| Whether signing constituted "converting to [his] own use" another's personal identification | Defendant converted the two written documents by using them under a false identity | "Convert to own use" requires appropriation/divestment or serious interference with owner’s rights; signing alone did not appropriate documents | Held: No reasonable factfinder could find conversion on these facts |
| Whether identity-theft conviction must be vacated given the above | State: 2001 amendment permits conviction for deception-based identity theft; documents are personal identification | Medina: Statutory acts charged (utter/convert) not proven on record; other offenses remain | Held: Identity-theft conviction reversed (judgment modified); other convictions affirmed; remand to modify judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160 (statutory interpretation—text, context, history framework)
- State v. Ziska/Garza, 355 Or. 799 (use of ordinary meaning when statute omits definition)
- State v. Ofodrinwa, 353 Or. 507 (inference from later statutory amendments regarding legislative intent)
- State v. Cloutier, 351 Or. 68 (presumption of consistent use of terms across related statutes)
- State v. Wimber, 315 Or. 103 (prosecution limited to allegations in the indictment)
- De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (same—notice and indictment limitations)
- Stevens v. Czerniak, 336 Or. 392 (considering statutory context, including common law, in interpretation)