State v. McNeil
1407023965
| Del. Super. Ct. | Oct 11, 2016Background
- On July 29, 2014 probation officers discovered McNeill in a motel room and, after a protective sweep, obtained supervisor approval to perform an administrative search of the room and a vehicle; drugs and paraphernalia were seized.
- McNeill was charged with new drug offenses and separately adjudicated guilty of violating probation for his 2010 convictions; he received a Level V sentence effective July 29, 2014.
- Trial counsel filed a motion to suppress the motel-room evidence; the Superior Court denied suppression in an April 23, 2015 opinion.
- McNeill later waived counsel, proceeded pro se briefly, then accepted a plea on drug-dealing and paraphernalia charges after a detailed plea colloquy; the court accepted the plea and found it knowing and voluntary.
- At sentencing the State moved to declare McNeill a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a); the court granted the motion and imposed four years at Level V for drug dealing and six months (suspended) for paraphernalia.
- McNeill filed a timely Rule 61 post-conviction motion alleging (1) illegal search, (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and (3) judicial abuse of discretion; the court denied relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legality of motel-room search | McNeill: search was a full, warrantless search without probable cause and violated probation guidelines | State: search was a protective sweep followed by an administrative search authorized by probation supervisors; suppression already denied | Denied — plea waived pre-plea suppression claims; suppression ruling not disturbed |
| Judicial abuse of discretion (probation hearing & sentences) | McNeill: hearing improperly scheduled, lacked notice, insufficient evidence, and sentences were excessive/biased | State: these claims are not cognizable in this Rule 61 collateral proceeding and are the proper subject of Rule 35 or of challenges in the underlying cases | Denied as procedurally improper in Rule 61; may be pursued under Rule 35 or in correct cases if not time-barred |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) | McNeill: counsel was biased, failed to investigate, failed to file/mismanage motions, failed to communicate, and aided the State | State/court: counsel filed motions (including suppression), communicated with McNeill, and record lacks specific, nonconclusory allegations of deficient performance or prejudice | Denied — allegations are vague, largely unsupported, and McNeill failed to show counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable or that he was prejudiced such that he would have gone to trial |
| Procedural bars under Rule 61 | McNeill: timely filed and raises IAC which can be raised post-conviction | State: other claims (e.g., sentence challenges, probation adjudication) are barred by Rule 61 or are not proper in this motion | Court: Motion timely as to IAC; other claims are procedurally barred or belong in other proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Whittle v. State, 138 A.3d 1149 (Del. 2016) (plea waives pre-plea claims)
- Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229 (Del. 2003) (Rule 61 procedural bars explained)
- Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53 (Del. 1988) (standard for prejudice in guilty-plea ineffective assistance claims)
- Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353 (Del. 1996) (strong presumption that counsel’s representation is reasonable)
- Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186 (Del. 1996) (conclusory allegations of IAC insufficient)
- Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1991) (procedural rules for collateral relief)
- Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552 (Del. 1990) (procedural defenses to post-conviction motions)