State v. McNeil, 365 P.3d 699

Background

Roland McNeil was convicted as an accomplice to an assault carried out by his son Quentin; phone records showing calls between their phones around the assault were central to the State's case.
At the preliminary hearing a now-deceased detective testified about the timing and length of six calls; at trial the State offered that preliminary hearing testimony because the detective had died.
Defense counsel initially objected on several grounds (lack of cross-examination, foundation, and hearsay), but after the trial judge ruled the preliminary-hearing statement was not hearsay defense counsel said, “Okay, it's not hearsay,” and later renewed a foundation objection which was rejected as untimely.
The detective’s testimony about the phone records was read to the jury; little other evidence of the calls was presented; McNeil was convicted and appealed claiming invited error, plain error, and ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Utah Court of Appeals rejected McNeil’s claims; the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether admission of the testimony was invited error and whether any error was prejudicial under plain-error and Strickland standards.

Issues

Issue	McNeil's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Did defense counsel "invite" the error by accepting the court's ruling that the prior testimony was not hearsay?	Counsel’s withdrawal of the hearsay objection was not an affirmative invitation to error; the court’s interpretation induced withdrawal.	Counsel’s acquiescence ("Okay, it's not hearsay") constituted invited error barring review.	No invited error: counsel did not make a clear affirmative misstatement of law; the trial court’s ruling caused the withdrawal.
Was admission of the detective’s preliminary-hearing testimony hearsay error subject to plain-error review?	The error should be reviewed under plain-error because the admission was erroneous and not invited.	If counsel acquiesced, plain-error review is barred by invited-error doctrine.	Plain-error review permitted because there was no invited error.
If error occurred, did it prejudice McNeil under Strickland/plain-error standards?	The admission was prejudicial because the phone-call evidence was critical; excluding it could have changed the verdict.	Any error was not prejudicial: the phone records existed, could have been admitted by other means (e.g., provider witness), and would have matched the detective’s testimony.	No prejudicial error: court confident the outcome would not have differed; defendant failed to show reasonable probability of different result.
Burden and standard for evaluating prejudice (plain error vs. ineffective assistance)?	McNeil urged a different or lighter prejudice standard for plain error and argued State should prove lack of prejudice.	Prejudice standard is Strickland (defendant bears burden to show reasonable probability undermining confidence in outcome).	Strickland standard applies; defendant bears burden to show prejudice.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes defendant's burden to show reasonable probability of different outcome to prove prejudice from counsel error)
State v. Moore, 289 P.3d 487 (Utah 2012) (discussed concerning hypothetical alternative trial paths and prejudice analysis)
State v. Richardson, 308 P.3d 526 (Utah 2013) (clarifies when party has "painted itself into a corner" and limits invited-error application)
State v. Geukgeuzian, 86 P.3d 742 (Utah 2004) (describes invited error doctrine discouraging parties from inducing erroneous rulings)
State v. Winfield, 128 P.3d 1171 (Utah 2006) (noting doctrines of invited error, plain error, and ineffective assistance arise on appellate review)