State v. McNeal, 201 N.E.3d 861

In September 2014 McNeal was accused of raping C.R. after an evening of drinking at her apartment; C.R. testified she was extremely intoxicated from alcohol and could not consent.
Medical blood and urine samples were taken from C.R. and later tested by a crime lab; McNeal was tried, convicted of rape (with a repeat-violent-offender specification), and sentenced.
After conviction McNeal obtained, via a public-records request to the police, a laboratory report showing no detectable alcohol in C.R.’s bloodstream about 3.5 hours after the alleged assault.
McNeal filed a motion for leave to move for a new trial under Crim.R. 33(B), asserting the state failed to disclose the lab report (Brady material) and that the suppression unavoidably prevented a timely new-trial motion; the state did not respond.
The trial court denied leave without a hearing (reasoning the presence of THC/benzodiazepines could still support impairment and that the state could not disclose what it did not know); the court of appeals affirmed, finding the motion untimely and not exculpatory.
The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed only whether McNeal made a prima facie showing that suppression of the lab report unavoidably prevented a timely Crim.R. 33(B) motion and held the trial court abused its discretion by denying leave.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether suppression of a posttrial-obtained lab report satisfies Crim.R. 33(B)’s “unavoidably prevented” requirement	McNeal: the undisclosed lab report was Brady material (impeaching/exculpatory) and its nondisclosure prevented timely filing	State: McNeal knew testing occurred, did not timely request the report, and the report was not necessarily exculpatory	Held: Court: McNeal made a prima facie showing the state suppressed favorable evidence; trial court abused discretion by denying leave; remand to grant leave to file a new-trial motion
Whether a defendant has a duty to "scavenge" for suppressed Brady material or to request records within a ‘‘reasonable time’’	McNeal: defendants need not scavenge for undisclosed Brady material and need not discover suppressed evidence through diligence to trigger Crim.R. 33(B) relief	State: McNeal’s posttrial public-records request was untimely; res judicata and lack of disclosure faulted the defense	Held: Court: Crim.R.33(B) contains no separate reasonable-time requirement; a Brady suppression basis can satisfy “unavoidably prevented”; defendants are not required to discover suppressed evidence themselves

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to accused)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (suppressed evidence is material if it undermines confidence in the verdict)
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (Brady duty covers impeachment and evidence known to police)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard for suppressed evidence)
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (defendant not required to search for undisclosed Brady material)
State v. Hawkins, 66 Ohio St.3d 339 (1993) (abuse-of-discretion standard for new-trial motions)
State v. Hessler, 90 Ohio St.3d 108 (2000) (same; appellate review of denial without evidentiary hearing)
Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427 (2021) (legal questions reviewed de novo)