State v. McMillon
436 S.W.3d 663
Mo. Ct. App.2014Background
- Defendant Jeremiah McMillon was charged in ten counts from three separate incidents involving four victims: kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible sodomy, robbery, and stealing a motor vehicle.
- He initially had a public defender (MSPD), moved to represent himself, and the trial court granted Faretta-style self-representation but appointed the public defender as standby counsel. MSPD moved to rescind the standby appointment citing constitutional and regulatory concerns; the trial court denied that motion.
- On the morning of trial Defendant moved to sever the L.P.‑related counts (6–10) from the other counts (1–5); the court denied severance.
- Jury selection began and the prosecutor opened, but Defendant then waived his jury right and the case proceeded as a bench trial with Defendant representing himself; standby counsel did not participate meaningfully.
- The trial court convicted on all counts and sentenced Defendant as a persistent offender to life on counts 1–9 (with some consecutive and concurrent dispositions) and 15 years on count 10. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) denial of his Faretta right by requiring standby counsel and (2) abuse of discretion in denying severance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appointing standby counsel over objection violated Sixth Amendment Faretta right | State: standby counsel is permitted; limits exist but appointment alone is not structural error | McMillon: appointment of MSPD as standby counsel forced counsel on him and violated right to proceed pro se (and state regulation) | Court upheld appointment; standby counsel did not meaningfully participate and McMillon retained control, so Faretta rights were vindicated |
| Whether appointment violated State regulation limiting MSPD employees from serving as standby counsel | State: regulatory issue does not affect Defendant's constitutional rights and MSPD could have challenged appointment | McMillon: Section 18 CSR 10-2.010(2) prohibits MSPD employees serving as standby counsel, so appointment was improper | Court: regulatory violation (if any) does not confer standing to Defendant and does not affect Faretta analysis; not a basis for reversal |
| Whether trial court abused discretion by denying severance of Counts 6–10 (L.P.) from Counts 1–5 (other victims) | State: joinder proper because offenses similar in character (college‑age victims, nighttime approaches, threats with firearm, robbery, sexual component); evidence distinct and uncomplicated; bench trial judge presumed not prejudiced | McMillon: combining charges improperly bolstered weak identification by L.P. and caused substantial prejudice | Court: joinder proper and Defendant failed to show particularized substantial prejudice; bench trial presumes judge not influenced by cross‑evidence; denial of severance not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (constitutional right to self‑representation)
- McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (standby counsel may be appointed; limits on unsolicited participation)
- State v. Black, 223 S.W.3d 149 (Mo. banc 2007) (Faretta right in Missouri; structural‑error context)
- State v. McKinney, 314 S.W.3d 339 (Mo. banc 2010) (severance standard; particularized showing of prejudice required)