513 P.3d 40
Or. Ct. App.2022Background
- Defendant McLarrin was a registered sex offender required to report a change of residence "within 10 days."
- Officer Flores contacted defendant on Aug 27 (registered address Helping Hands) and again on Sept 6; on Sept 6 defendant said he was living at his aunt’s house.
- On Sept 8 defendant told Flores he would update his registration the next day and said he believed he had lived at his aunt’s house "less than 10 days."
- On Sept 10 defendant told Flores he had been living with his aunt for "more than 10 days" ("probably two weeks") and was arrested for failing to report.
- At trial the state introduced those statements and a later registration form showing a move date of Sept 7; defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal arguing the Sept 10 confession could not be the sole basis for conviction under ORS 136.425(1).
- The trial court treated Sept 6/8 statements as admissions that corroborated the Sept 10 confession and denied the motion; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the independent evidence did not tend to prove the critical fact (that the move occurred more than 10 days before Sept 10).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Sept 6/8 admissions independently corroborated the Sept 10 confession under ORS 136.425(1) for failure-to-register (10-day) element | Admissions + confession together show defendant changed residence and failed to register within 10 days | Admissions only show move occurred between Aug 27 and Sept 6; admissions are equally consistent with move before or after the cutoff, so only the confession establishes the >10-day fact | Corroboration insufficient; admissions did not tend to establish the specific fact that defendant moved on or before Aug 31, so confession could not be used to sustain conviction; reversal |
| What specific "injury or harm" must be corroborated under the corpus delicti rule | The state may rely on evidence showing a change of residence and failure to register generally | The statutorily specified harm is the act of waiting more than 10 days after a change of residence without reporting; that specific fact must be corroborated | Court: the relevant harm is waiting more than 10 days after moving without reporting; corroboration must tend to establish that precise fact |
| Standard for "some proof" of the relevant fact (degree and quality of independent evidence required) | Circumstantial evidence consistent with the confession can corroborate it | Independent evidence must do more than be merely consistent; it must tend to establish the particular fact corroborated (not leave only speculation) | Court: "some proof" means evidence from which a jury may draw an inference that tends to establish the relevant fact; mere consistency is not enough |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Nickles, 299 Or App 561 (2019) (independent evidence must tend to establish the specific fact to corroborate a confession)
- State v. Chatelain, 347 Or 278 (2009) (corpus delicti rule requires proof, independent of confession, that the injury/harm occurred and was caused by criminal activity)
- State v. Lerch, 296 Or 377 (1984) (defining "some proof" standard for corroboration of confessions)
- State v. Simons, 214 Or App 675 (2007) (confession may be considered only when supported by legally sufficient corroborating evidence)
- State v. Moreno, 276 Or App 102 (2016) (standard of review for denial of judgment of acquittal: view evidence in light most favorable to state)