127 Conn. App. 70
Conn. App. Ct.2011Background
- Defendant Lloyd McLaren was convicted by jury of sexual assault in the fourth degree under § 53a-73a (a)(2).
- The incident occurred in a Bridgeport home where A.F., a certified nursing assistant, was attending an elderly patient; E, B, Y, and a boyfriend Wright resided there; McLaren was the resident boyfriend.
- A.F. testified McLaren repeatedly touched her, restrained her, and attempted to assault her; she reported the conduct to a supervisor and police.
- Police arrest relied on A.F.’s account and Wright’s statement; Wright described a crude admission by McLaren which was never admitted as evidence.
- Pretrial motion in limine sought to exclude Wright’s double hearsay statement; court granted with caveat if defendant opened the door at trial.
- During trial, the prosecutor referenced Wright’s statement in cross-examination and later in closing, and the court replayed portions during deliberations; the jury acquitted on two counts and convicted McLaren on the fourth-degree count.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutorial impropriety denied due process | McLaren contends impropriety occurred via multiple improper references to Wright’s statement. | McLaren argues the state’s cross-examination and closing argument violated the motion in limine and introduced non-evidentiary, prejudicial material affecting credibility. | Yes; impropriety denied due process, requiring reversal and new trial. |
| Whether Wright’s statement and related cross-examination violated confrontation rights | McLaren asserts the cross-examination and references violated confrontation principles. | McLaren contends the state improperly used out-of-evidence content to impeach credibility. | Court addresses as part of due process issue; primary holding—due process violation found. |
| Preservation of error and appellate review standards | Prosecutorial impropriety was not preserved by objection or mistrial motion. | Relying on Williams factors allows review notwithstanding preservation to protect due process. | Two-step Williams framework applied; due process violation established. |
| Severity, frequency, and centrality of the improprieties | Prosecutor’s conduct was limited in scope and not central to guilt. | Prosecutor’s repeated references to Wright’s statement and police report were central and prejudicial. | Improprieties were frequent and severe, especially cross-examination and closing references. |
| Impact of the improprieties on the verdict | State contends sufficient evidence of guilt despite improprieties. | Improprieties likely influenced jurors given lack of physical evidence beyond credibility. | Sum total of improprieties deprived defendant of a fair trial; reversal warranted. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523 (1987) ( Williams factors for evaluating prosecutorial impropriety and due process)
- State v. Coney, 266 Conn. 787 (2003) (two-step analysis: impropriety and its effect on due process)
- State v. Holloway, 116 Conn.App. 818 (2009) (prosecutorial impropriety in cross-examination)
- State v. Griffin, 97 Conn. App. 169 (2006) (prosecutor may not present facts not in evidence; improper unsworn statements)
- State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693 (2002) (witness testimony; improper characterization of another witness' testimony as a lie)
- State v. Reynolds, 118 Conn.App. 278 (2009) (application of Williams factors to prosecutorial impropriety)