State v. McKinney, 2019 Ohio 1118

Kevin McKinney was tried for crimes related to the June 4, 2015 murder of Aaron Ladson; the jury acquitted him of all homicide-related counts but convicted him of obstructing justice (R.C. 2921.32(A)(6)) and a bench conviction for having weapons while under disability.
Evidence showed McKinney texted and communicated with Lawrence Kennedy and others; prosecutors argued McKinney sent Kennedy to Ladson’s address to have Ladson killed to protect McKinney’s brother (Douglas Shine) from prosecution for earlier murders. McKinney testified he sent Kennedy to obtain a recanted statement from Ladson and planned to pay Ladson money.
The obstructing-justice indictment and jury instruction listed multiple alternative means (e.g., arranging murder, bribing for a recantation, discarding a phone) in the disjunctive; the jury asked during deliberations which crime “the person aided” had committed.
McKinney moved post-verdict to set aside the obstructing-justice conviction arguing the verdict was not unanimous because it could be based on different acts; the trial court denied the motion.
After conviction, McKinney pleaded guilty to one count of tampering with records in a separate case; at sentencing the trial court imposed maximum prison terms on several counts and ordered them to run consecutively, resulting in a total (journaled) nine-year sentence; McKinney appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether obstructing-justice conviction violated jury unanimity / due process	State: The indictment and instructions define a single offense; jury need not agree on which alternative means was used.	McKinney: Multiple distinct acts could have supported conviction (ordering murder, bribery, destroying phone), so jury must be unanimous as to the specific act.	Court: This is an "alternative means" (not multiple acts) case; unanimity as to the single crime sufficed and substantial evidence supported each alternative means — conviction affirmed.
Whether consecutive and maximum sentences were lawful	State: Sentences within statutory ranges and court considered R.C. 2929.11/2929.12; consecutive terms justified.	McKinney: Consecutive and maximum sentences are unsupported; trial court erred in findings and used "and/or" when referencing R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b).	Court: Individual maximum sentences not contrary to law; but trial court’s consecutive-sentence finding used "and/or" (improperly conjunctive statute), so remanded for the court to make the required R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings on the record.

State v. Gardner, 889 N.E.2d 995 (Ohio 2008) (distinguishes "alternative means" from "multiple acts" for jury unanimity)
State v. Adams, 45 N.E.3d 127 (Ohio 2015) (reaffirms Gardner unanimity analysis)
Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999) (jury need not unanimously agree on which underlying brute facts prove an element when multiple means exist)
United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984) (inconsistent verdicts across counts do not require overturning convictions)
State v. Johnson, 545 N.E.2d 636 (Ohio 1989) (requires jury unanimity where indictment divides into distinct conceptual groupings)
State v. Thompson, 514 N.E.2d 407 (Ohio 1987) (example of alternative-means unanimity analysis)
State v. Hicks, 538 N.E.2d 1030 (Ohio 1989) (acquittal on related counts does not negate conviction on separate count)