State v. McGee, 2018 Ohio 3171

In 1999 Belvin McGee pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offenses against his children and stipulated he "is a sexual predator" under former R.C. 2950 (House Bill 180). He was sentenced to lengthy prison terms.
McGee's convictions were affirmed, but in 2007 this court found his original sentence void because postrelease control was not lawfully imposed and remanded for resentencing.
At a 2008 resentencing the trial court imposed the same prison terms and, incorrectly under Ohio law, classified McGee as a Tier III sex offender under the Adam Walsh Act.
This court later held the Tier III classification was improper for pre-2007 offenses (per State v. Williams) and remanded for the limited purpose of vacating the Tier III classification and reinstating the former statutory "sexual predator" classification under R.C. 2950.09(A).
On remand the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc entry classifying McGee as a sexual predator pursuant to former R.C. 2950.09(A). McGee appealed pro se, arguing the nunc pro tunc entry was barred and that reclassification violated State v. Holdcroft (and double jeopardy principles).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court lacked authority to reimpose the prior "sexual predator" classification via nunc pro tunc after a voided sentence and resentencing	State (trial court) argued the court complied with this court's limited remand to vacate the Tier III classification and reinstate the former sexual-predator classification, which was automatic based on McGee's 1999 plea stipulation	McGee argued the original sentence was void, so the nunc pro tunc entry reimposing the sexual-predator status was barred and he was entitled to a de novo resentencing hearing	Court held reimposition was proper: McGee's 1999 plea stipulation automatically established sexual-predator status and remained effective despite the voided sentence; no de novo resentencing was required
Whether reclassifying McGee as a sexual predator after he has served portions of his sentence violates Holdcroft/double jeopardy	State characterized Megan's Law classifications as civil, collateral consequences distinct from criminal punishment and within the court's authority to impose	McGee invoked Holdcroft and double jeopardy, asserting that reclassification operated as an impermissible increase to his sentence once portions were served	Court held Holdcroft is inapplicable: Megan's Law classifications are civil/remedial, not part of the sentence, so reclassification did not violate Holdcroft or double jeopardy

State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 2011) (held retroactive application of the Adam Walsh Act to pre-enactment offenders is unconstitutional)
State v. Holdcroft, 1 N.E.3d 382 (Ohio 2013) (held a court lacks jurisdiction to alter a completed prison sentence)
State v. Fischer, 942 N.E.2d 332 (Ohio 2010) (limits of remand sentencing hearings when postrelease control was not properly imposed)