State v. McFarland (Concurrence), SC20802

Defendant Willie McFarland was prosecuted for murder more than three decades after the victim's death; he claimed the prearrest delay violated due process under the Connecticut Constitution.
The Connecticut Supreme Court's majority announced a new Geisler-based state constitutional balancing test for prearrest (preindictment) delay claims.
Justice D'Auria concurred in the judgment only: he agreed the conviction should be affirmed but rejected the majority's creation of a new state constitutional balancing test.
D'Auria urges continued application of the federal two‑pronged Marion/Lovasco test (actual substantial prejudice + unjustifiable/deliberate delay) and finds Connecticut precedent (e.g., Hodge) and constitutional text/history do not demand broader state protection.
He emphasizes legislative safeguards (statutes of limitations; §54‑56 dismissal power) and existing trial/evidentiary tools, warns the new balancing approach will impose heavy practical burdens, and would affirm because the defendant failed the unjustifiable‑delay prong.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Connecticut's constitution requires a new state balancing test for prearrest delay	McFarland: state due process affords broader protection; adopt balancing test	State/D'Auria: no; federal two‑pronged test suffices	D'Auria: decline to create new constitutional balancing test; would apply Marion/Lovasco and affirm conviction
Proper standard for prearrest‑delay claims	Adopt Geisler/Matthews‑style balancing weighing prejudice vs. state justification	Continue Marion/Lovasco two‑pronged test (prejudice + unjustifiable governmental motive)	D'Auria: retain Marion/Lovasco; require actual substantial prejudice and unjustifiable delay
Whether to decide state constitutional question here (avoidance)	Plaintiff seeks definitive state constitutional rule	D'Auria: avoid unnecessary constitutional pronouncement when it makes no difference to relief	D'Auria: exercise constitutional avoidance; assume without deciding only if needed
Practicality and administrative burden of new test	Plaintiff: balancing protects defendants in cold‑case prosecutions	D'Auria: balancing imposes heavy evidentiary, resource, and consistency costs on prosecutors and courts	D'Auria: balancing is impractical and harmful; existing statutory and evidentiary tools suffice

United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (establishes two‑pronged test for preindictment delay: actual prejudice + deliberate tactical delay)
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (clarifies limited role of due process; investigative delay may be justified)
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (discusses Marion/Lovasco framework)
State v. Hodge, 153 Conn. 564 (Connecticut pre‑Marion precedent treating investigative delay and aligning with a prejudice/intent inquiry)
State v. Echols, 170 Conn. 11 (holds statute of limitations is primary safeguard against stale charges)
United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 (5th Cir. en banc critique of balancing approach; highlights administrability problems)
State v. Kinchen, 243 Conn. 690 (§54‑56 dismissal power should be sparingly exercised; courts weigh fundamental fairness)
State v. Daren Y., 350 Conn. 393 (discusses the legislative purpose of statutes of limitations as safeguards)