State v. McFarland
399 P.3d 1106
| Wash. | 2017Background
- Cecily McFarland was convicted of first-degree burglary, 10 counts of theft of a firearm, and 3 counts of unlawful possession of a firearm; trial court imposed standard-range terms and ordered all firearm-related sentences to run consecutively to one another but concurrently with the burglary, producing a 237-month aggregate term.
- At sentencing defense counsel asked for low-end standard-range terms and expressed concern about proportionality but did not request an exceptional downward sentence running the firearm sentences concurrently.
- The State and defense both operated on the assumption that RCW 9.41.040(6) and RCW 9.94A.589(1)(c) required consecutive sentences for multiple firearm convictions.
- On appeal McFarland argued the court erred by not recognizing discretion to impose an exceptional mitigated sentence (running firearm sentences concurrently) under RCW 9.94A.535, relying on In re Pers. Restraint of Mulholland.
- The Court of Appeals declined to consider the new argument and rejected an ineffective-assistance claim; the Washington Supreme Court granted review, extended Mulholland's reasoning to RCW 9.94A.589(1)(c), vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing so the trial court may consider an exceptional concurrent sentencing decision.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (McFarland) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RCW 9.94A.535 permits a sentencing court to impose an exceptional mitigated sentence by running multiple firearm-related sentences concurrently under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(c) | Mulholland's statutory analysis applies; § 9.94A.535 authorizes downward exceptional concurrent sentences when consecutive standard-range terms yield a presumptively excessive aggregate sentence | The firearm statutes require consecutive sentences; Mulholland should not be extended to (1)(c) | Yes. Mulholland extends to RCW 9.94A.589(1)(c); § 9.94A.535 authorizes exceptional concurrent sentencing in appropriate cases |
| Whether RCW 9.41.040(6) (“notwithstanding any other law”) precludes exceptional concurrent sentencing | The “notwithstanding” language does not bar exceptional mitigated sentences; to read it otherwise would allow circumvention by term reductions and produce anomalous results | The plain “notwithstanding any other law” forbids any other law (including § 9.94A.535) from authorizing concurrency for these firearm offenses | Majority: does not preclude exceptional concurrent sentences for § 9.94A.589(1)(c); Dissent (Fairhurst) disagrees and would read the statute as preclusive |
| Whether McFarland is entitled to resentencing because the trial court mistakenly believed it lacked discretion to impose concurrent exceptional sentences | Trial court’s comments show it believed it lacked discretion; sentencing courts must meaningfully consider authorized exceptional sentences; remand required so court can consider mitigation | Court of Appeals: issue not preserved; no error shown on record; remand not warranted absent ineffective-assistance showing | Majority: vacate and remand for resentencing because record indicates possibility the court would have considered an exceptional sentence if it knew it had discretion |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to request an exceptional concurrent sentence at sentencing | Counsel’s failure was prejudicial because the argument (Mulholland extension) was viable and could have altered outcome | Counsel was not deficient: the extension was novel and no published authority required raising it; tactical decision reasonable | Court of Appeals' ineffective-assistance ruling affirmed in part; Supreme Court did not find counsel ineffective and remanded on the basis of trial court error in not considering the option when it appeared to think no discretion existed |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Pers. Restraint of Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d 322 (2007) (trial courts may impose exceptional concurrent sentences for presumptively consecutive serious violent offenses under RCW 9.94A.535)
- State v. Graham, 181 Wn.2d 878 (2014) (affirming that RCW 9.94A.535 does not differentiate among subsections of the SRA multiple-offense provisions)
- State v. McReynolds, 117 Wn. App. 309 (2003) (concluded RCW 9.41.040(6) required consecutive sentences for specified firearm crimes)
- State v. McGill, 112 Wn. App. 95 (2002) (remand for resentencing where record showed trial court refused to exercise discretion or misunderstood its sentencing authority)