State v. McDonald, 954 N.E.2d 1031

In 2008, DCS removed McDonald's three children due to unsanitary home conditions; A.M. alleged molestation by McDonald, while J.M. later could speak and accused him in 2010; K.M. had no allegations.
December 2008: State charged McDonald with two counts of Class A felony child molesting, one Class C felony, and three Class D felony neglect; later added a Class D felony count for sexual conduct in the presence of a minor.
March 2009: McDonald pled guilty to Class D felony performing sexual conduct in the presence of a minor; remaining charges were dismissed.
2010: J.M.’s speech improved; July 2010 reinterview yielded accusations that McDonald molested J.M.; September 2010 charges included three counts of Class A felony child molesting and two counts of Class B felony vicarious sexual gratification.
December 2010: McDonald moved to dismiss under the successive prosecution statute (I.C. 35-41-4-4); trial court dismissed the J.M. charges; State appeals.
The panel reverses and remands, holding the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the J.M. charges because McDonald should not have been charged with those offenses at the time of the prior proceeding.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether dismissal was proper under the successive prosecution statute.	McDonald should have been charged earlier under joinder rules.	J.M. offenses could not be joined at prior prosecution due to lack of probable cause.	Discretionary dismissal improper; J.M. charges could not have been joined then.

Williams v. State, 762 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 2002) (joinder principles govern when offenses may be joined)
State v. Wiggins, 661 N.E.2d 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (prosecution not always piecemeal when evidence exists at first filing)