State v. McCray, 773 S.E.2d 914

Background

On Sept. 16, 2009, Ron McCray was charged with the murder of Reginald Porcher after witnesses placed McCray at the scene, saw him with a gun/weapon, and heard him make statements like “die mother‑f*er, die.”
Multiple eyewitnesses (Joyce Wright, Felicia Coaxum, Akeem Ashby, James Boykin) testified for the State; Boykin corroborated incriminating post‑shooting admissions and actions (helping McCray with a paycheck and tools, then calling 911).
McCray testified, claiming self‑defense: he said he believed Porcher reached for a weapon, he retrieved a shotgun, fired, then kicked Porcher; his account contained inconsistencies about seeing a weapon and whether Porcher was bleeding.
The court admitted DNA testimony from a SLED peer reviewer (who did not perform the tests) summarizing a non‑testifying analyst’s report; McCray objected under the Confrontation Clause.
McCray sought to introduce Porcher’s SCDC medical/disciplinary records and testimony about Porcher’s prior crimes, drug use, and violent acts to support self‑defense; the court excluded much of that as irrelevant or too remote.
McCray also sought a statutory “stand your ground” jury instruction (S.C. Code § 16‑11‑440(C)); the court declined and instead gave the Davis self‑defense instruction. McCray was convicted and sentenced to life; he appealed.

Issues

Issue	McCray's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether court erred by refusing to give §16‑11‑440(C) language (stand‑your‑ground)	Requested charge was required because McCray was an heir to the property and had no duty to retreat	Circuit court’s Davis instruction already covered self‑defense and no additional instruction was warranted by the facts	Affirmed — no error; Davis charge adequate given facts (McCray approached, shot, then kicked victim)
Whether admission of DNA peer reviewer’s testimony violated Confrontation Clause	Testimony was hearsay from non‑testifying analyst; expert merely acted as conduit without independent analysis	Testimony admissible as expert explanation of lab results	Error acknowledged — expert was a conduit and admission violated Confrontation Clause, but error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given overwhelming corroborating evidence
Whether exclusion of evidence about victim’s prior crimes, drug use, and violent acts was erroneous	Such evidence was relevant to show victim’s propensity for violence/state of mind and supported self‑defense	Evidence was situation‑specific, remote in time, not directed at defendant, or overly prejudicial vs. probative	Affirmed — exclusion proper; evidence was not sufficiently connected in time/occasion to show state of mind or produce reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm
Whether prosecutor’s delayed disclosure of two witnesses’ criminal records required a second unlimited cross‑examination (Brady claim)	Failure to timely produce impeachment records was suppression of favorable evidence that was material to the defense	State admitted oversight; records were impeachment material but not so material as to undermine confidence in verdict given corroborating testimony	Affirmed — Brady not violated because suppressed impeachment evidence was not material in context of corroborating testimony and strong prosecution case

Key Cases Cited

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial hearsay and Confrontation Clause rule requiring opportunity to cross‑examine declarant)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (factors for harmless‑error analysis when Confrontation Clause error alleged)
State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45 (1984) (model jury instruction for self‑defense, including no duty to retreat on own premises)
State v. Gracely, 399 S.C. 363 (2011) (harmless‑error factors including witness importance and corroboration)
State v. Logan, 405 S.C. 83 (2013) (review of jury charges as a whole)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution’s duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused)