205 A.3d 1178
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.2019Background
- Two defendants (McCray and Gabourel) were released pretrial under the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA) subject to conditions: McCray was ordered not to commit any offense; Gabourel was ordered to a 6pm–6am curfew.
- Each subsequently violated their release condition: McCray committed new credit-card–fraud offenses and pled guilty to several counts; Gabourel was observed outside during curfew and arrested.
- Both were charged with criminal contempt under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a) for willfully disobeying judicial orders (the CJRA release conditions).
- Trial judges dismissed the contempt charges, concluding the CJRA and its implementing rules do not permit contempt prosecutions for violation of pretrial-release conditions and raising double-jeopardy concerns (in McCray).
- The State appealed; the Appellate Division reversed, holding (1) CJRA does not preclude contempt prosecutions for willful violations of pretrial-release orders, (2) a pretrial-release order is a “judicial order” under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a), (3) defendants had adequate notice, and (4) double jeopardy did not bar McCray’s contempt prosecution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CJRA and court rules preclude criminal contempt charges for violating pretrial-release conditions | State: CJRA and rules do not preclude contempt; prosecutors retain charging authority | Defendants: Legislative omission shows intent to limit remedies to revocation/other CJRA remedies | Held: CJRA does not preclude contempt prosecutions; statute/rules govern court remedies but do not strip prosecutor’s authority to charge contempt |
| Whether a pretrial-release condition is a "judicial order" under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a) | State: Yes; release conditions are judicial orders and enforceable by contempt | Defendants: Conditions are regulatory/conditional, akin to probation or juvenile orders, and not intended for contempt prosecution | Held: Release conditions remain judicial orders; violations may support contempt charges |
| Whether defendants received adequate notice that contempt prosecution could follow violation | State: N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a) gives fair notice; CJRA requires courts to inform defendants of conditions and consequences | Defendants: CJRA’s silence and absence of explicit contempt warning deprive notice | Held: Statute and orders provided fair notice; defendants could reasonably foresee contempt liability |
| Whether double jeopardy bars prosecuting contempt for commission of new offenses that are also charged separately | State: Double jeopardy does not bar because elements differ | Defendants (McCray): Prosecution for contempt plus substantive offenses results in multiple punishments for same conduct | Held: Applying Blockburger (same-elements) test, contempt and the substantive offenses require different elements; double jeopardy does not bar prosecution |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161 (N.J. 2010) (judicial no-contact/bail orders retain character as judicial orders and support contempt charges)
- State v. Miles, 229 N.J. 83 (N.J. 2017) (New Jersey applies the Blockburger same-elements test for double jeopardy)
- United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (U.S. 1993) (Supreme Court plurality and fractured opinions on whether contempt convictions bar later substantive prosecutions)
- State v. Williams, 234 N.J. Super. 84 (App. Div. 1989) (probation-condition violations may not be prosecuted as criminal contempt when legislature provided exclusive sanctions)
- State ex rel. S.S., 183 N.J. 20 (N.J. 2005) (juvenile-order violations are inappropriate to prosecute under criminal contempt given juvenile rehabilitative purpose)
- In re DeMarco, 83 N.J. 25 (N.J. 1980) (due-process/notice principle: crimes and punishments must give fair notice)