State v. Matteson, 985 N.W.2d 1

Background

Z.M. (born ~2002) disclosed prior sexual abuse by her father, Dale Matteson, including a 2015 forensic interview and counseling; she attempted suicide in Feb 2017 and attributed it to that abuse.
On July 17, 2019, Matteson approached a 17‑year‑old Z.M. naked and propositioned her; she reported the incident and he was arrested the next day.
Z.M.’s mental health deteriorated after July 17; she was treated for suicidal ideation in early September and cited Matteson’s conduct as the predominant stressor.
On Sept 20, 2019, Z.M. died from Benadryl poisoning; suicide notes and a journal were recovered from a locked car.
Criminal proceedings: Matteson pleaded guilty to attempted incest and was tried and convicted by a jury of intentional child abuse resulting in death (Class IB); he appealed, challenging statutory vagueness, sufficiency of proximate‑cause proof, certain jury instructions, several evidentiary rulings, and exclusion of Z.M.’s journal.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Matteson’s Argument	Held
Whether Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28‑707(8) (child abuse resulting in death) is void for vagueness as applied	Statute requires proximate cause; settled common‑law meaning gives fair notice and minimal‑guidelines protection	Phrase "results in the death" is vague as applied to a suicide; lacks legislative/judicial guidance whether victim suicide can "result from" abuse	Statute not unconstitutionally vague; court interprets "results in the death" to require proximate cause (Muro) and close/factual cases do not make statute vague
Sufficiency of evidence that Matteson’s abuse proximately caused Z.M.’s suicide	Evidence showed decline after July incident, prior suicide attempt tied to Matteson, medical testimony that abuse was predominant stressor — supports but‑for and foreseeability elements	Suicide was an independent, unforeseeable efficient intervening cause; expert and investigator testimony showed low correlation between sexual abuse and completed suicide	Viewing evidence most favorable to prosecution, a rational jury could find but‑for causation and that Z.M.’s suicide was foreseeable (no efficient intervening cause)
Whether trial court erred by refusing defendant’s proposed proximate‑cause instruction mentioning "efficient intervening cause"	NJI proximate‑cause instruction adequately states law; efficient intervening cause is subsumed and a separate instruction would confuse jurors	Proposed instruction was legally correct and warranted by evidence; omission prejudiced defense	No reversible error: the pattern NJI instruction given correctly stated law and was not prejudicial (Sacco reasoning applied in criminal context)
Admissibility of prior‑bad‑acts evidence (niece’s testimony, friend’s statement, 2015 forensic interview)	Evidence admitted under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27‑404(2) and as inextricably intertwined with charged conduct to show intent, absence of mistake, and to present a coherent factual setting	Prior‑acts testimony was propensity evidence and prejudicial; friend’s hearsay and portions of forensic interview should have been excluded	No abuse of discretion: testimony and video were admissible under § 27‑404(2) and inextricably intertwined; friend’s testimony even if erroneous was cumulative/harmless (Oldson, Chavez, Munoz)
Exclusion of Z.M.’s handwritten journal under the residual hearsay exception	Trial court properly found journal lacked sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness and notice requirements; entries were not created for medical diagnosis/treatment in a way that ensured reliability	Journal was trustworthy (journaling as therapeutic), material, more probative than other evidence, and should have been admitted under the residual exception	No abuse of discretion: court correctly applied § 27‑803(24) as setting mandatory prerequisites (trustworthiness, materiality, probative superiority, interests of justice, and notice) and excluded the journal

Key Cases Cited

State v. Muro, 269 Neb. 703 (proximate‑cause requirement for child‑abuse resulting in death)
State v. Irish, 292 Neb. 513 (elements and application of proximate cause in criminal cases)
State v. Montoya, 304 Neb. 96 (statutory construction and constitutional questions are legal and reviewed de novo)
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (void‑for‑vagueness standard for criminal statutes)
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (factually close cases do not render statute vague; vagueness concerns meaning, not difficulty of proof)
Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (vagueness doctrine and common‑law meanings)
Sacco v. Carothers, 253 Neb. 9 (civil precedent: efficient intervening cause subsumed by proximate‑cause instruction)
State v. Oldson, 293 Neb. 718 (trial court discretion on prior‑acts admissibility)
State v. Chavez, 281 Neb. 99 (analysis under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27‑404(2))