State v. Matson
526 S.W.3d 156
| Mo. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Appellant Terry L. Matson lived with the child victim G.C.; G.C. was about five when Matson began touching her "private areas" with his penis and mouth on multiple occasions. Parties disputed whether intercourse occurred.
- The State gave pretrial notice under Mo. Const. Art. I, § 18(c) seeking to admit prior-act testimony from two other alleged child victims, M.N. (1994) and A.B. (2007), as propensity/corroborative evidence.
- The trial court found M.N. and A.B. legally and factually similar to G.C.’s allegations and admitted their testimony; Matson’s motion in limine was denied.
- At trial, a recorded Child Advocacy Center interview of G.C. was played; when asked whether Matson used his “boy part” to touch her “girl part” inside or outside, G.C. answered “inside.”
- Matson was convicted of two counts of statutory sodomy and one count of statutory rape; he appealed on four grounds (admission of propensity evidence for M.N. and A.B.; sufficiency of evidence for statutory rape; and retrospective application of § 18(c)). The appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Matson's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| I — Admissibility of M.N. testimony under Art. I, §18(c) | Prior acts are logically relevant and admissible under §18(c) to show propensity/corroboration | M.N.’s acts too dissimilar/remote to have probative value and were unfairly prejudicial | Admission not an abuse of discretion; evidence logically relevant and Matson failed to show probative value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice |
| II — Admissibility of A.B. testimony under Art. I, §18(c) | Same: §18(c) permits prior-act propensity evidence if relevant | A.B.’s acts were temporally remote/dissimilar and prejudicial | Same as I: properly admitted under §18(c); no abuse of discretion |
| III — Sufficiency of documentary evidence for statutory rape conviction | G.C.’s recorded interview unambiguously establishes penetration (she said Matson touched her “inside”) supporting a reasonable juror’s guilty verdict | Interview was ambiguous (questions about inside/outside of clothing could mean inside clothing, not genital penetration) | Documentary evidence was unambiguous; conviction for statutory rape is supported by sufficient evidence |
| IV — Retroactive application of Art. I, §18(c) to admit pre‑amendment prior acts | §18(c) is a procedural evidentiary rule; it applies prospectively to trials and may be applied to pre‑amendment conduct at trial | §18(c) should apply only to acts occurring on or after amendment’s effective date (Dec. 4, 2014) | Following State ex rel. Tipler v. Gardner, §18(c) may be applied to trials even when evidence concerns pre‑amendment acts; no error |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. banc 1993) (previously prohibited propensity evidence)
- State v. Ellison, 239 S.W.3d 603 (Mo. banc 2007) (addressing constitutionality of statute permitting propensity evidence)
- State v. Vorhees, 248 S.W.3d 585 (Mo. banc 2008) (holding certain corroborative "signature" evidence was prohibited propensity evidence)
- State ex rel. Tipler v. Gardner, 506 S.W.3d 922 (Mo. banc 2017) (holds Art. I, §18(c) is a procedural evidentiary rule and may be applied to trials involving pre‑amendment conduct)
- State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500 (Mo. banc 2011) (standard for appellate sufficiency review)