State v. Martinson
241 Ariz. 93
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- In 2004, Jeffrey Martinson was indicted for first-degree felony murder and child abuse after his son, J.E.M., died from acute carisoprodol toxicity while in Martinson’s care. The State sought the death penalty.
- At the 2011 trial, the superior court (relying on State v. Styers) barred the State from presenting evidence or argument that Martinson intentionally killed the child, limiting the State to proving child abuse as the predicate felony for felony murder.
- The jury convicted Martinson of felony murder and child abuse, but the penalty phase ended in a mistrial. Post-trial, the court granted a new trial on other grounds but denied prosecutorial-misconduct claims.
- The State re-indicted Martinson (2012) adding a premeditated murder count and moved to dismiss the 2004 indictment without prejudice; Martinson opposed and the superior court instead dismissed the 2004 indictment with prejudice, finding prosecutorial misconduct for violating the Styers-based ruling.
- The Court of Appeals held the superior court erred: Styers does not preclude the State from proving an intent-to-kill theory when child abuse is the predicate felony for felony murder, so dismissal with prejudice was improper; remanded to allow dismissal without prejudice and rejected Martinson’s insufficiency/double-jeopardy claim as a cross-issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Styers barred the State from presenting intent-to-kill evidence when child abuse is the predicate felony for felony murder | State argued it could not pursue an intent-to-kill theory under the superior court’s Styers-based preclusion | Martinson argued prosecutors violated the court order and pursued an uncharged intent-to-kill theory | Court held Styers is limited to premeditated-murder/child-abuse convictions and does not bar proving intent to kill when child abuse is the felony-murder predicate; superior court’s preclusion was legally erroneous |
| Whether prosecutorial misconduct warranted dismissal with prejudice (double jeopardy/structural impairment) | Martinson contended prosecutors repeatedly and intentionally violated the court’s Styers ruling, prejudicing his trial and justifying dismissal with prejudice | State contended any rule violations did not cause cognizable prejudice because the law allowed proof of intent to kill; lesser sanctions (or dismissal without prejudice) appropriate | Court held even if prosecutors violated the order, Martinson failed to show the required prejudice to bar retrial; dismissal with prejudice vacated; instructs dismissal without prejudice |
| Whether retrial is barred by double jeopardy due to insufficient evidence (Burks claim) | Martinson argued the evidence was insufficient to sustain convictions so double jeopardy bars retrial | State argued the record contains substantial evidence supporting guilt and retrial is permitted | As a cross-issue, court found sufficient evidence to support the convictions; double jeopardy does not bar retrial |
| Appropriate remedy and appellate posture | State sought reversal of dismissal with prejudice and instruction to dismiss without prejudice | Martinson cross-appealed (and raised cross-issues) challenging denial of Rule 20 motions | Court vacated dismissal with prejudice, remanded to grant dismissal without prejudice, and denied Martinson’s requested relief on insufficiency grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104 (1993) (held child-abuse conviction merged with premeditated murder on those facts; emphasized limited holding and noted child abuse can remain a predicate for felony murder)
- State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118 (1993) (companion to Styers; reiterated Styers’ limited scope)
- State v. Lopez, 174 Ariz. 131 (1992) (held when legislature designates a felony as a predicate for felony murder, no merger occurs)
- State v. Miniefield, 110 Ariz. 599 (1974) (arson may serve as predicate felony for felony murder despite possible intent to kill; predicate felonies need not be distinct in mental state)
- State v. Moore, 222 Ariz. 1 (2009) (confirmed predicate felony need not be independent from homicide; burglary with intent to kill can predicate felony murder)
- State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424 (2004) (standard of review for dismissal orders; double jeopardy retrial bar analysis)