State v. Martin (Slip Opinion)
2017 Ohio 7556
| Ohio | 2017Background
- On Sept. 27, 2012, David Martin entered Melissa Putnam’s home during a drug transaction, bound Putnam and Jeremy Cole, robbed them, shot Cole (killing him) and shot Putnam (wounding her). Martin then burned his clothes and was later arrested; ballistics matched the recovered .40-caliber handgun to the shooting.
- A jury convicted Martin of aggravated murder (with three death specifications), attempted aggravated murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, tampering with evidence, and related firearm specifications.
- At trial the State elected capital sentencing on the murder-with-prior-calculation count; the jury recommended death and the trial court imposed death.
- Martin raised multiple claims on direct appeal: prejudicial pretrial publicity (venue), ineffective assistance of counsel during voir dire, suppression issues (entry into third-party premises and Miranda warnings), sufficiency of evidence for tampering, and penalty-phase procedural and weighting errors.
- The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed convictions and the death sentence after independent review of aggravating and mitigating factors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Martin) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether pretrial publicity and local media coverage required change of venue | Publicity was not so pervasive as to presume prejudice; voir dire showed most jurors unaware or unbiased | Publicity (including a jail hostage incident) was pervasive and presumptively prejudicial | No presumed or actual bias; venue denial affirmed |
| Whether counsel was ineffective during voir dire | Counsel’s voir dire choices were reasonable strategy; no prejudice shown | Counsel failed to probe publicity, hostage incident, death-penalty attitudes, acquaintances, and failed to use peremptories | No ineffective assistance: performance reasonable and no prejudice under Strickland |
| Whether entry into third-party apartment to arrest Martin required a search warrant and required suppression of the gun | Even if a warrant was required, Martin failed to show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the host’s apartment | Entry violated Steagald; gun should be suppressed | Suppression denied: Martin did not prove expectation of privacy; conviction evidence admissible |
| Whether unwarned and subsequent warned statements should be suppressed under Miranda | Many statements were unsolicited/spontaneous; warnings were given before interrogations and waiver was valid | Early unwarned statements and later statements that mirrored pre-warning comments tainted confession | Statements admissible: pre-warnings were voluntary; warnings were given and waived; later stationhouse confession admissible |
| Whether evidence was sufficient to support tampering-by-destruction conviction (burning clothes) | Reasonable inference clothes bore incriminating evidence and homicide would likely be investigated; Martin guided officers to burned pile | State failed to prove destroyed items were relevant or that he knew investigation was likely | Evidence sufficient: relevance and knowledge of likely investigation reasonably inferred |
| Whether penalty-phase procedure and evidence/instructions improperly allowed consideration of guilt-phase facts or nonstatutory aggravators | State may introduce guilt-phase evidence relevant to proven statutory aggravators; instructions limited jury to evidence relevant to aggravators and mitigation | Admission of broad guilt-phase evidence, prosecutor arguments, and trial court wording impermissibly weighed facts or relied on nonstatutory aggravators | No reversible error: evidence relevant to aggravators admitted, instructions adequate, trial court properly weighed aggravators vs mitigation |
Key Cases Cited
- Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (televised confession can create presumptive prejudice)
- Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (presumed prejudice is limited to extreme cases)
- Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (arrest-warrant entry into third-party home requires a search warrant absent exceptions)
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (arrest warrants authorize limited entry into suspect’s residence but not third-party homes)
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (defendant must show legitimate expectation of privacy to challenge a search)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation requires warnings; volunteered statements are admissible)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (an understanding of Miranda warnings and uncoerced statements can establish an implied waiver)