State v. Marshall, 1 CA-CR 14-0501-PRPC

Background

In 1998, at age 16, Joshua Adam Marshall pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, armed robbery, theft, and arson; the court imposed concurrent life terms with "possibility of parole after 25 years," ordered consecutive to other terms.
Arizona had abolished parole in 1993, so at sentencing Marshall in 1998 the only realistic avenue for release after 25 years was executive clemency/commutation.
Marshall filed a Rule 32 post-conviction petition relying on Miller v. Alabama, arguing mandatory life-without-meaningful-parole for juveniles is unconstitutional and sought resentencing.
The superior court consolidated similar claims, found Miller was retroactive, but concluded Arizona remedied any Miller violation by later restoring parole eligibility for juvenile lifers via H.B. 2593 (enacting A.R.S. § 13-716 and amending § 41-1604.09(I)).
Marshall argued he was improperly denied a resentencing to raise challenges to H.B. 2593 (retroactivity, separation of powers, ex post facto), and that parole under the statute does not satisfy Miller.
The Court of Appeals granted review but denied relief, holding that the statutory changes provide a meaningful opportunity for parole and that Marshall’s other attacks were meritless.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Miller apply retroactively to Marshall’s sentence?	Miller is a significant change in law and applies retroactively; Marshall is entitled to relief.	State agreed Miller is retroactive but contends statutory changes remedy any violation.	Miller is retroactive; Montgomery confirms retroactivity.
Does Arizona’s H.B. 2593 (A.R.S. § 13-716 / § 41-1604.09(I)) cure a Miller violation by restoring parole eligibility?	Marshall: statutory parole does not sufficiently remedy Miller; he should be resentenced so issues about H.B. 2593 can be litigated.	State: permitting juvenile lifers to be considered for parole satisfies Miller; H.B. 2593 provides meaningful opportunity for release.	Held: H.B. 2593 remedies Miller because it makes juvenile lifers eligible for parole after the minimum term.
Does application of H.B. 2593 retroactively violate separation of powers or statutory intent?	Marshall: legislature did not intend retroactive application and doing so violates separation of powers.	State: legislature expressly made parole eligibility available for offenses committed before 18 regardless of date; retroactivity is proper and judicially recognized.	Held: Court rejects separation-of-powers and retroactivity challenges; prior Arizona decisions (e.g., Vera) reject these arguments.
Does applying the statutory parole regime create an ex post facto violation (e.g., removing right to absolute discharge)?	Marshall: statute takes away a vested right to discharge from parole, imposing lifetime supervision, violating ex post facto.	State: at the time of the offense (1998) parole had already been abolished for post-1994 offenders; Marshall had no vested right to discharge or parole.	Held: Ex post facto claim fails—Marshall had no vested parole/discharge right when he offended.

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life imprisonment without meaningful opportunity for release is unconstitutional for juveniles in nonhomicide cases)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller announced a substantive rule that is retroactive; states may remedy Miller by permitting parole consideration)
State v. Valencia, 239 Ariz. 255 (App. 2016) (discussing Miller’s retroactivity in Arizona)
State v. Vera, 235 Ariz. 571 (App. 2014) (rejecting similar challenges to legislative parole restoration)
State v. Newton, 200 Ariz. 1 (2001) (sentencing governed by law in effect at time of offense)