State v. Marquis
257 P.3d 775
Kan.2011Background
- Marquis pled guilty to two drug charges and to felony theft; sentences imposed consecutively with a 52-month term and a dispositional departure placing him on probation.
- Nearly a year later Marquis stipulated to probation violations; district court revoked probation and reinstated it with additional conditions, including boot camp.
- A few months later the State sought to revoke again, alleging failure to complete Labette Correctional Camp; the State produced the testimony of Chuck McGuire while Nicole Luna did not testify.
- The State presented Luna's affidavit stating Marquis was removed from Labette on November 15, 2007 for disciplinary discharge; the district court sustained Marquis’s hearsay objection to the discharge report for not being sworn.
- McGuire testified Luna would have direct knowledge as supervising officer and that Luna’s chronos showed entry and discharge dates; district court relied on Luna’s affidavit to find a violation and sent Marquis to DOC.
- Court of Appeals affirmed; Supreme Court granted review to address confrontation and due process precedents in probation revocation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause applicable to probation revocation? | Marquis argues Crawford overruled Yura and requires confrontation. | State contends Crawford does not apply to probation revocation, so confrontation not required. | Sixth Amendment not applicable to probation revocation. |
| Which due process standard governs: Yura two-factor good-cause or Palmer reliance? | Yura's two-factor test controls for dispensing with confrontation. | Palmer suffices for the due process inquiry. | Yura two-factor test governs; remand to evaluate good cause. |
| Did the district court properly assess good cause for admitting Luna's affidavit in lieu of live confrontation? | Affidavit is inadmissible without proper good cause; confrontation should occur. | Affidavit offered reliable substitute for live testimony. | Remand to apply Yura's two-factor analysis to determine good cause. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1973) (minimum due process rights in probation revocation)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1972) (due process in probation revocation)
- Yura, 250 Kan. 198 (Kan. Supreme Court, 1992) (two-factor good cause test for dispensing with confrontation)
- Palmer, 463 F. Supp. 2d 551 (E.D. Va. 2006) (probation revocation confrontation framework)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2004) (redefining confrontation and testimonial hearsay)
- Leshay, 289 Kan. 546 (Kan. Supreme Court, 2009) (confrontation rights in preliminary/posttrial contexts)