State v. Mark Melvin (083298) (Essex County & Statewide), 258 A.3d 1075

Two consolidated New Jersey Supreme Court appeals (State v. Melvin; State v. Paden‑Battle) asked whether judges may rely on conduct for which a jury returned not‑guilty verdicts when choosing a defendant’s sentence.
Melvin: indicted for murder and related offenses; juries convicted him only of unlawful possession of a handgun and later acquitted him of the murder/assault counts; the trial judge twice relied on evidence underlying the acquitted murder counts (citing Watts) to impose an extended, aggravated term.
Paden‑Battle: convicted of kidnapping, conspiracy to kidnap, and felony murder but acquitted of first‑degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder; the sentencing judge treated her as the mastermind of the killing (contrary to the acquittals) and imposed an enhanced 60‑year term.
Appellate Division: remanded Melvin for resentencing (criticizing use of Watts) and vacated Paden‑Battle’s sentence, remanding for resentencing; both matters reached the Supreme Court on the sentencing issue.
The State argued sentencing judges have broad discretion and may consider acquitted conduct (per Watts); defendants argued doing so violates due process and the presumption of innocence under the New Jersey Constitution.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
May a judge consider acquitted conduct at sentencing?	Yes — judges may consider all relevant conduct and rely on a preponderance standard (Watts).	No — doing so undermines the jury verdict, the presumption of innocence, and violates due process/fundamental fairness.	No — under Article I, ¶ 1 (fundamental fairness) NJ constitution forbids enhancing sentences based on conduct of which a jury acquitted the defendant.
Does Apprendi control?	Apprendi is inapplicable because sentences did not exceed the statutory maximum.	Apprendi principles support requiring jury findings for facts that increase punishment.	Apprendi does not apply here because neither defendant was sentenced above the statutory maximum for their convictions.
Is Watts dispositive (federal precedent permitting consideration of acquitted conduct)?	Yes — Watts allows consideration of acquitted conduct by a preponderance at sentencing.	No — Watts is limited and does not resolve state due process/fundamental fairness questions under New Jersey law.	Watts is not dispositive; New Jersey’s Constitution provides greater protection and precludes reliance on acquitted conduct to enhance sentences.
Remedy and reassignment on remand	Affirm sentences or remand without reassignment.	Remand for resentencing and assignment to a different judge.	Court reversed Melvin, affirmed vacatur in Paden‑Battle, remanded both for resentencing, and ordered reassignment to a different judge.

United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (federal rule permitting sentencing courts to consider acquitted conduct by a preponderance of the evidence)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any fact that increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (limitations on federal sentencing regime and caution about Watts’ scope)
People v. Beck, 939 N.W.2d 213 (Mich. 2019) (Michigan Supreme Court holding due process bars sentencing as if defendant committed crimes of which jury acquitted)
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (refining Apprendi and illustrating the problem of judicial fact‑finding that functionally increases punishment)
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980) (recognizing the special weight and finality of a jury’s acquittal)
State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293 (2019) (New Jersey sentencing precedent cited in the opinions)