State v. Mark Dunbar (077839) (Monmouth and Statewide
163 A.3d 875
| N.J. | 2017Background
- On May 3, 2013, Officer Tardio stopped Mark Dunbar for parking in a handicapped space; two passengers (Lisa and Deborah Parker) were with him.
- Police had recent tips linking Dunbar to narcotics sales and recognized his green Ford Focus from prior encounters.
- Backup Officer Major arrived with a narcotics canine; officers checked warrants and learned Deborah Parker had an outstanding warrant, and requested a female officer to effect that arrest.
- At some point while the stop was ongoing (timeline unclear), the narcotics canine sniffed the exterior of Dunbar’s vehicle and alerted to narcotics.
- After the alert, Dunbar consented to a search (after a tow truck arrived); officers recovered Xanax, oxycodone, and heroin. Dunbar was indicted for possession.
- Trial court suppressed the evidence (holding officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the sniff and consent was not voluntary); Appellate Division affirmed under a New Jersey reasonable-suspicion rule for canine sniffs. The State appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Dunbar) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard for canine sniffs during lawful traffic stops | No independent reasonable suspicion required; follow federal precedent—canine sniffs are sui generis and permissible so long as they do not prolong the stop | New Jersey should require independent reasonable suspicion under Article I, ¶ 7 to conduct a canine sniff | Court adopts federal standard: no independent reasonable suspicion required, but sniff may not prolong stop beyond its mission absent reasonable suspicion |
| Whether canine sniff that adds time to a stop is permissible | A sniff is allowed if it does not add time; if it does, the State can justify delay by independent reasonable suspicion | If sniff prolonged the stop and lacked reasonable suspicion, it was unconstitutional | Delay that adds time to stop is unlawful unless supported by independent reasonable suspicion (adopting Rodriguez principle) |
| Application to Dunbar’s suppression ruling | The State contends facts (prior tips, prior arrest, vehicle identification, passenger with warrant) gave reasonable suspicion and/or sniff did not prolong stop | Dunbar argues sniff lacked reasonable suspicion and record is unclear on timing so suppression proper | Court reversed Appellate Division and remanded for factfinding on whether sniff prolonged the stop and, if so, whether independent reasonable suspicion existed |
| Admissibility of consent post-sniff | State: consent was voluntary after being advised of rights and arrival of tow truck | Dunbar: consent was coerced by presence/number of officers and threat of towing | Court did not resolve voluntariness; remanded for trial-court factfinding tied to timing/validity of sniff and consent |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (canine sniff is not a Fourth Amendment "search"; sui generis and less intrusive)
- City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (drug-sniffing dog around vehicle at checkpoint did not transform seizure into a search)
- Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (canine sniff during lawful traffic stop does not require reasonable suspicion so long as it does not infringe privacy interests)
- Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015) (officers may not prolong a completed traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff absent independent reasonable suspicion)