State v. Mario Ibarra Bernal, 03-14-00652-CR

Background

Defendant Mario Ibarra Bernal was arrested for DWI after officers observed signs of intoxication; he refused a portable breath test and refused voluntary blood draw. Officers later directed jail phlebotomist to draw blood under Tex. Transp. Code §§ 724.011/724.012(b)(3)(B). No warrant was obtained.
Trial court found officers credible, found probable cause and good-faith reliance on the Transportation Code, but concluded there were no exigent circumstances and granted the motion to suppress the blood results under the Fourth Amendment (citing Missouri v. McNeely).
The State appealed, arguing (1) the mandatory-draw statute is constitutional and authorizes warrantless blood draws; (2) implied consent under § 724.011 rendered the draw valid; (3) even if unconstitutional, Texas’s exclusionary rule (art. 38.23) should not bar the evidence because officers complied with then-controlling Texas law; and (4) the federal exclusionary rule should not bar admission because officers acted in objective good faith reliance on statute and precedent.
The State acknowledges that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. Villarreal held mandatory warrantless blood draws violate the Fourth Amendment and that implied consent withdrawn by a suspect cannot substitute for voluntariness; the State preserves contrary arguments but focuses on exclusionary-rule and good-faith issues in light of Villarreal.
Procedural posture: trial court suppressed; State asks the Third Court of Appeals to reverse and remand.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Bernal's Argument	Held (trial court)
1) Whether the mandatory-draw statute authorizes a reasonable warrantless blood draw	Statute (Tex. Transp. Code § 724.012(b)(3)(B)) mandates draws and is constitutionally reasonable under a Fourth Amendment balancing test	Warrant required absent an exception; statute cannot override Fourth Amendment protections	Suppression — warrantless draw violated the Fourth Amendment (no exigency)
2) Whether implied consent statute validates the draw	§ 724.011(a) deems drivers to have consented and that implied consent is irrevocable and satisfies consent exception	Any implied consent was withdrawn; Fourth Amendment requires free and voluntary consent	Suppression — withdrawn/implied consent insufficient to validate warrantless draw
3) If unconstitutional, whether Texas exclusionary rule (art. 38.23) bars the evidence	Article 38.23 does not apply because officers complied with then-existing Texas precedent treating dissipation as exigent; evidence was not "obtained in violation" of the law as it existed	Evidence obtained in violation of constitutional protections should be excluded under art. 38.23	Trial court suppressed; State preserves argument that exclusionary rule should not apply given then-controlling law
4) If unconstitutional, whether federal exclusionary rule bars admission	Good-faith exceptions apply: reliance on statute (Illinois v. Krull) and on binding precedent (Davis) — exclusion would not further deterrence	Exclusion required to vindicate Fourth Amendment rights post-McNeely	Trial court suppressed; State argues Davis/Krull preclude exclusion for pre-McNeely conduct

Key Cases Cited

Aliff v. State, 627 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (Texas precedent treating blood dissipation as exigent circumstance)
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (U.S. 1957) (blood draw minimally intrusive in some contexts)
Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (U.S. 2013) (reasonableness balancing under Fourth Amendment for certain compelled DNA/bodily-sample searches)
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (U.S. 2013) (natural dissipation of alcohol in bloodstream does not create a per se exigency)
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (U.S. 1985) (limits on physically invasive searches for evidence)
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (U.S. 1983) (implied-consent and testimonial vs. physical-evidence distinctions)
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (U.S. 1987) (good-faith reliance on statute can justify exclusionary-rule exception)
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (U.S. 2011) (good-faith reliance on binding precedent can limit exclusionary rule)