State v. Marin, 745 S.E.2d 148

On July 20, 2008, Manuel Marin shot and killed Nelson Tabares in a car after Tabares, heavily intoxicated, grabbed Marin and repeatedly tried to seize the steering wheel.
Marin testified he fired because he reasonably feared death or serious bodily injury; passenger Jimenez did not testify but earlier statements corroborated Marin’s account.
Marin was charged with murder and possession of a weapon during a violent crime; jury convicted him of murder and he received life imprisonment.
At trial Marin requested two jury charges: (1) language instructing that if justified in firing the first shot a defendant may continue shooting until the danger has completely ended, and (2) a charge on S.C. Code §16-11-450(A) immunity for justified deadly force.
The trial court refused both requests but instructed the jury on self-defense (deadly force allowed when reasonably necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury).
On appeal Marin argued error in refusing the “continuing to shoot” instruction and the immunity instruction; the court affirmed.

Issue	Marin's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether trial court erred by refusing a "continuing to shoot" jury instruction (defendant may continue shooting until danger has completely ended)	Requested language protects a defendant who fired the first shot and reasonably believed danger persisted	Requested phrasing is incorrect or unnecessary because charge must be that subsequent shots are lawful only if reasonably necessary at the time	No error — trial court’s self-defense instruction (deadly force when reasonably necessary) adequately and correctly stated the law; requested wording was legally problematic and unnecessary
Whether trial court erred by refusing to charge immunity under S.C. Code §16-11-450(A)	Marin sought jury instruction on statutory immunity for those justified in using deadly force	§16-11-450(A) is a procedural mechanism granting pretrial immunity, not a substantive jury instruction	No error — the statute is procedural (pretrial immunity); substantive self-defense law was charged and the immunity provision is not a jury instruction

State v. Rye, 375 S.C. 119 (discussed dissent and trial charge language regarding continuing to shoot)
Douglas v. State, 332 S.C. 67 (approving jury language that a defendant may continue to shoot until danger ceases in a different context)
State v. Hendrix, 270 S.C. 653 (stated rule that firing first shot may justify continuing to shoot until danger appears to have ceased)
State v. Fuller, 297 S.C. 440 (trial court must consider facts and may need to give specific self-defense charges supported by the record)
State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491 (restating the reasonable-belief/necessity standard for deadly-force self-defense)
State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45 (articulating elements of self-defense including reasonable belief of imminent danger)
State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526 (holding courts need not use exact requested verbiage so long as correct law is charged)