783 S.E.2d 808
S.C.2016Background
- Marin drove an intoxicated Victim from a nightclub; during the drive an altercation occurred and Marin shot Victim twice in the head, then continued driving and was later arrested.
- Marin was indicted for murder and possessing a firearm during a violent crime; he claimed self-defense at trial.
- The trial court gave a detailed self-defense instruction (the four-part Davis framework) but did not include Marin’s requested specific language that a person justified in firing the first shot may continue shooting until the apparent danger has ended.
- Marin did not request the specific wording until after the court charged the jury; the jury later asked about malice and voluntary manslaughter but not self-defense.
- The jury convicted Marin; the court of appeals affirmed his conviction, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the adequacy of the jury charge.
Issues
| Issue | Marin’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct that a person justified in firing the first shot may continue shooting until the danger has ended | Marin: Requested explicit "continuing to shoot" language; argued it’s a correct and applicable statement of law that should have been charged | State: Trial court’s comprehensive instruction already conveyed the substance of self-defense law; precise wording unnecessary | The Court affirmed: the requested wording stated correct law but the trial court’s charge, read as a whole, adequately encompassed the principle and omission was not reversible error |
| Whether the requested language was a correct statement of law | Marin: The language correctly states common-law principle (citing Hendrix) | State: Did not dispute correctness but emphasized sufficiency of existing charge | Court: Agreed the language is a correct statement of law (citing Hendrix) |
| Whether refusal to give the requested charge was reversible under precedent (e.g., Fuller) | Marin: Relied on Fuller and related cases requiring tailoring of self-defense charges to the facts | State: Argued Fuller is distinguishable because the trial court’s charge here covered the applicable principles | Court: Distinguished Fuller — here the charge exceeded Davis requirements and included the substance of applicable law |
| Whether trial judge’s refusal implicated constitutional prohibition on judges charging on facts | Marin: Argued requested wording was necessary and permissible | Dissent: Warned requested wording was close to impermissible comment on facts; but still said it should have been charged | Court: Cautioned against charges that trespass on facts; upheld charge as lawful declaration of law without factual commentary |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hendrix, 270 S.C. 653, 244 S.E.2d 503 (1978) (recognizes that when justified in firing the first shot one may continue to shoot until apparent danger has ceased)
- State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 713 S.E.2d 591 (2011) (appellate review considers jury charge as a whole; charge must state current and correct law)
- State v. Fuller, 297 S.C. 440, 377 S.E.2d 328 (1989) (trial court erred by giving only general Davis charge when facts required additional self-defense principles)
- State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 317 S.E.2d 452 (1984) (per curiam) (articulates the four-part framework for self-defense jury instructions)
- State v. Rye, 375 S.C. 119, 651 S.E.2d 321 (2007) (discussed in context; the precise "continuing to shoot" language appears only in a dissent and is not controlling)