State v. Manion
112 A.3d 506
| Md. | 2015Background
- Manion, an unlicensed contractor, entered into multiple home-improvement contracts (2009–2011) and represented himself/companies as “licensed, bonded, & insured.”
- Homeowners paid substantial sums (examples: Murphys $10,000; Lakes $3,400; Jameses ~$2,000; Harsha ~$6,072; Russells >$350,000 total) but many projects were never started or completed and materials were not delivered.
- After nonperformance, Manion offered a series of inconsistent or demonstrably false excuses and only made partial or last-minute refunds (some refunds issued the week before trial).
- Evidence at trial included cashing of checks (Murphys), bank records showing incomplete escrow deposits (Russells), subcontractor testimony that funds were diverted for personal use, missing stored property, and failure to obtain permits.
- Trial court convicted Manion of five counts of theft by deception (Crim. Law §7-104(b)) and two counts of conspiracy; Court of Special Appeals reversed for insufficiency of evidence as to intent; Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed the intermediate court.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Manion's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that defendant had intent to deceive and to deprive at time of obtaining control (theft by deception under §7-104(b)) | Misrepresentations about licensure plus pattern of nonperformance, repeated false excuses, diversion of funds, sham businesses, cashing checks, last-minute refunds — all permit reasonable inference of intent to deprive | Nonperformance and excuses alone are insufficient; refunds and partial performance show no intent to permanently deprive; Coleman controls | Reversed Court of Special Appeals; evidence (circumstantial + subsequent acts) was sufficient for a rational factfinder to infer the requisite intent |
| Whether later acts (excuses, refunds) can be used to infer intent at time of obtaining money | Later conduct that is recent and connected to initial deception supports inference of intent; statute allows such inferences (but not sole reliance on nonperformance) | Later lies/excuses do not reliably prove state of mind at contracting and may reflect other motives | Court: later acts (false excuses, concealment, diversion of funds) can be used to infer intent when considered with other evidence; statute bars inferring intent solely from nonperformance |
| Application of Coleman v. State (distinguishing cases of non-criminal breach) | Coleman is distinguishable: Coleman showed bona fide efforts to perform and transfers of title; here funds were taken without equivalent performance and were diverted | Argues Coleman requires reversal because both involve contractors who failed to complete projects | Court: Coleman distinguished — Coleman showed efforts to perform and legitimate claim to funds; here circumstantial evidence showed deceit and diversion supporting criminal intent |
| Proper appellate standard when reviewing sufficiency of evidence in bench trial | Defer to trier of fact; ask whether any rational trier of fact could find elements beyond a reasonable doubt | N/A (Manion argued only insufficiency) | Court applied Jackson v. Virginia standard (defer to factfinder; reverse only if clearly erroneous) |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (establishes standard for sufficiency of evidence review)
- Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452 (Maryland application of Jackson standard)
- State v. Coleman, 423 Md. 666 (distinguishes noncriminal breach where defendant had bona fide claim/right and undertook efforts to perform)
- Bible v. State, 411 Md. 138 (limits inference from post-event lies when no other evidentiary context supports intent)