State v. Maise, 167 So. 3d 608

Background

Four defendants (Maise, Ward, King, Ayo) were indicted for aggravated rape and attempted aggravated rape based on an incident in June 2008 involving 15‑year‑old R.P.; defendants were convicted by a 10–2 jury and sentenced to lengthy prison terms.
R.P.’s account evolved repeatedly over time: initial disclosures to peers, repeated denials of penetration in police/forensic interviews for over a year, then full trial testimony alleging digital and penile/vaginal penetration and forcible conduct by multiple defendants.
A.L., R.P.’s friend and a prosecution witness who received transactional immunity, gave inconsistent testimony at trial—one version minimizing penetration and a later version implicating defendants more directly.
After trial, defense uncovered witnesses who testified that (1) R.P. told others shortly after the arrests that the sexual‑assault story was fabricated and her injuries came from a four‑wheeler accident, and (2) A.L. told a detention‑center cellmate that R.P.’s account was false.
The State’s case turned primarily on R.P.’s and A.L.’s credibility; DNA and medical evidence were equivocal or did not confirm penetration by all defendants.
The trial court denied a second supplemental motion for a new trial; the First Circuit affirmed; the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, vacated convictions, and remanded for a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence undermining witness credibility.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial	State: prior inconsistencies were known to jury; new testimony is merely impeaching/recantation and not grounds for new trial	Defendants: post‑trial witnesses reported contemporaneous admissions that R.P. fabricated the rape claim; evidence is material and likely to change verdict	Court: new evidence (overheard admissions + corroboration) was not merely cumulative or recantation; new trial required
Standard for assessing motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence	State: applying ordinary rule that recantations are suspicious and impeachment alone usually insufficient	Defendants: evidence was discovered after trial, diligence shown, material, and likely outcome‑determinative	Court: applied four‑part test (discovery after trial; diligence; materiality; likely different verdict) and found all met
Admissibility/substantive value of prior inconsistent statements	State: prior inconsistent statements are impeachment, not substantive	Defendants: some prior statements were corroborated and thus admissible as substantive under La. C.E. 801(D)(1)(a)	Court: R.P.’s pretrial statements (denying penetration/attributing injuries to ATV) were corroborated (e.g., Megan’s testimony) and were more than mere impeachment
How to treat recantation or changed testimony	State: recantations are tantamount to perjury and courts may deny new trial on that basis	Defendants: R.P.’s earlier denials were prior inconsistent statements, not recantation of trial testimony (they occurred before trial)	Court: distinguished true recantation from prior inconsistent statements made before trial and rejected per se exclusion; treated the post‑trial evidence as substantial impeachment that could alter jury verdict

Key Cases Cited

Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956) (discusses the suspicion courts attach to recantations)
State v. Cavalier, 701 So.2d 949 (La. 1997) (articulates Louisiana standard for newly discovered evidence grounds for a new trial)
State v. Clayton, 427 So.2d 827 (La. 1982) (addresses admissibility and effect of prior inconsistent statements and impeachment)