State v. Maestas, 298 Kan. 765

Background

Defendant Michael Maestas called 911 admitting he stabbed his mother; video/audio and his statements were admitted at trial. He described hearing voices and said he "got out of control." Autopsy showed ~150 stab wounds.
Pretrial competency evaluation found Maestas competent; defense psychologist Dr. Goodman diagnosed a psychotic disorder and produced a low IQ score; State experts disputed those conclusions.
The State obtained an in limine order (K.S.A. 22-3219) limiting evidence about mental disease/defect because Maestas did not file the statutory notice to assert a mental-disease defense.
At trial Maestas presented sister testimony about recent auditory hallucinations but the court restricted testimony about hallucinations more than a few weeks before the killing; jury convicted Maestas of premeditated first-degree murder.
Postconviction hearings: court conducted statutory evaluations under K.S.A. 21-4634 (mental retardation) and K.S.A. 22-3430 (commitment to state hospital vs. prison); court found Maestas not mentally retarded and denied commitment to Larned; sentenced to life with 25-year minimum.

Issues

Issue	Maestas' Argument	State's Argument	Held
Prosecutorial misconduct in closing	Prosecutor misstated a sister's testimony and implied victim feared defendant; this prejudiced the jury	Most remarks were reasonable inferences from evidence; one minor misstatement was harmless	One mischaracterization (sister) was improper but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; conviction stands
Failure to instruct on reckless second-degree murder	Evidence (dark room, mistaken identity of victim due to voices) supported reckless murder instruction	Evidence showed Maestas saw his mother asleep and stabbed her repeatedly with intent; no evidence he did not intend death	Court did not err: no rational basis for reckless-second instruction given evidence of intentional, repeated stabbing
Limiting evidence of auditory hallucinations (right to present defense)	Testimony about prior hallucinations was relevant to negate intent/premeditation and explain defendant's state of mind	Maestas failed to serve written notice under K.S.A. 22-3219; any use to negate intent falls within the statute and required notice	Exclusion under K.S.A. 22-3219 was proper; court did not unconstitutionally abridge Maestas' right to present a defense; testimony within immediate pre-incident period was admitted
Finding Maestas not "mentally retarded" under K.S.A. 21-4634	Goodman's IQ testing put Maestas in the mentally retarded range; court ignored statutory definition and recent testing	State evaluator (Shannon) challenged test reliability and relied on prior evaluations showing higher IQ; court should defer to weighing of conflicting expert evidence	Abuse of discretion standard applies; court did not abuse its discretion in finding Maestas not mentally retarded based on substantial competent evidence
Denial of commitment to state security hospital (K.S.A. 22-3430)	Combined evidence from experts showed need for psychiatric care and benefit from Larned placement; court should have committed him in lieu of prison	Commitment is discretionary even if statutory prerequisites are met; report ordered under K.S.A. 22-3429 controlled and court reasonably exercised discretion to imprison	Appellate review of denial is for abuse of discretion; court did not abuse discretion in refusing commitment to Larned and sentencing to prison

Key Cases Cited

State v. Pennington, 281 Kan. 426 (upheld exclusion of mental-disease evidence absent showing it negates required mental state)
State v. White, 279 Kan. 326 (limits on expert testimony about mental disease and intent)
State v. Tahah, 293 Kan. 267 (prosecutor may argue reasonable inferences but not facts not in evidence)
State v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970 (framework for reviewing prosecutorial misconduct and harmlessness)
State v. Deal, 293 Kan. 872 (definition and application of reckless second-degree murder)
State v. Backus, 295 Kan. 1003 (standard for initial "reason to believe" mental-retardation finding)
State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201 (prosecutor may employ vivid or colorful language within limits)
State v. Cordray, 277 Kan. 43 (examples of sufficient evidence supporting reckless homicide theory)
State v. Murray, 285 Kan. 503 (discussed provocation of prosecutor's improper statements; later limited by Marshall)
State v. Marshall, 294 Kan. 850 (prosecutor remains accountable for misconduct even if provoked)