State v. Madigan
199 Vt. 211
Vt.2015Background
- Defendant Charles Madigan was convicted by a jury of three counts of lewd and lascivious behavior with a child based solely on the alleged victim A.R.’s testimony describing multiple incidents while she lived in defendant’s home.
- A.R. lived with Madigan and his daughter as a teenager and described three episodes of sexual contact that she only disclosed to friends years later; a lock was later installed on her bedroom door.
- At trial the State elicited testimony from two witnesses (defendant’s ex‑wife and A.R.’s friend J.H.) that A.R. had a reputation for truthfulness.
- The State also asked J.H. to recount A.R.’s out‑of‑court statements that she had been sexually abused and that she kept her door locked because she was afraid.
- In rebuttal closing the prosecutor urged the jury to imagine A.R. as “poor” and “maybe hungry,” language for which defendant objected and the court overruled.
- The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding the reputation testimony and the hearsay statement improperly admitted and the prosecutor’s closing argument improper; errors were not harmless.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of witnesses’ testimony about A.R.’s reputation for truthfulness (V.R.E. 608(a)) | The testimony was proper rehabilitation because defense attacked A.R.’s credibility through motive, inconsistencies, and memory lapses | Defense did not mount a general attack on A.R.’s character for truthfulness; cross aimed at specific inconsistencies, motive, and memory (impeachment), not general dishonesty | Admission of reputation testimony was error: defendant’s impeachment was routine contradiction/motive evidence, not an attack on general truthfulness, so rehabilitation was improper |
| Admission of J.H.’s repetition of A.R.’s accusations as hearsay | State invoked V.R.E. 803(3) (state of mind) or the “fresh‑complaint” doctrine to admit the statements | Statements were classic hearsay offered to prove the abuse (backward‑looking memory/belief), not a present state of mind; fresh‑complaint is not an independent exception | Admission of J.H.’s recounting of A.R.’s accusations was inadmissible hearsay; 803(3) inapplicable and Court rejects fresh‑complaint as freestanding doctrine |
| Prosecutor’s rebuttal closing: appeals to sympathy (characterization of A.R. as “poor” and “maybe hungry”) | State argued comments were based on evidence and reasonably explained why A.R. stayed with defendant | Defense argued argument injected unsupported, inflammatory facts and appealed to juror sympathy | Prosecutor’s statements exceeded permissible argument and were improper (invited sympathy via speculation) |
| Prejudice / Harmless‑error analysis | State contended errors were harmless because evidence against defendant was strong | Defense argued combined errors undermined the credibility contest where A.R.’s testimony was dispositive | Errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: A.R. was the sole witness to offenses and vouching plus hearsay and improper argument could have tipped the scales; conviction reversed |
Key Cases Cited
- Stevenson v. Gunning’s Estate, 25 A. 697 (Vt. 1892) (historical discussion on inadmissibility of reputation evidence absent attack)
- United States v. Dring, 930 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing attacks on bias from attacks on general truthfulness)
- State v. Carr, 725 P.2d 1287 (Or. 1989) (holding motive to lie is not necessarily an attack on general truthfulness)
- State v. Eugenio, 579 N.W.2d 642 (Wis. 1998) (prior inconsistent statements and motive to lie do not automatically imply general untruthfulness)
- United States v. Lukashov, 694 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2012) (contrasting cases where entire strategy depicted witness as a liar generally)
- Pierson v. Brooks, 768 P.2d 792 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (warning that exception cannot swallow rule)
- State v. Verrinder, 637 A.2d 1382 (Vt. 1993) (framework for Rule 803(3) admissibility)
- United States v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1980) (state‑of‑mind exception does not permit backward‑looking statements explaining the state of mind)
- State v. Blair, 583 A.2d 591 (Vt. 1990) (in credibility contests, third‑party vouching for victim may be outcome‑determinative)
