389 P.3d 1121
Or.2017Background
- Police received a 10-minute-old 911 call from Velek’s mother reporting that a named man ("Wilson") was inside Velek’s home yelling and threatening to break things.
- Two Salem officers who knew the residence arrived, saw a male (defendant) walking down the driveway away from the house, and called to him; he walked back to the porch after being ordered to stop.
- Officers testified they suspected defendant might be Wilson and that a crime related to the disturbance (e.g., criminal mischief, menacing, assault) may have occurred; the trial court found their testimony credible.
- Officers asked about weapons/drugs and, with consent, searched defendant, finding a meth pipe; defendant later was discovered to have used a false name.
- The trial court denied suppression; the Court of Appeals reversed for lack of reasonable suspicion; the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Maciel-Figueroa) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper standard for reasonable suspicion to stop a person under OR/Const art I, §9 | Officers may stop if totality of circumstances gives a moderate chance that some criminal activity is afoot and the person is somehow involved | Officers must reasonably suspect, based on specific and articulable facts, that the person committed or is about to commit a specific crime or type of crime | Court held officers must suspect a specific crime or type of crime based on specific and articulable facts |
| Scope of appellate review of investigatory stops | Review may consider broader possibilities of crime suggested by the totality of circumstances, even if officer did not articulate that crime at hearing | Review must be limited to the record of the officer’s actual belief and the facts the officer articulated at the suppression hearing | Court held review is limited to the officer’s actual subjective belief and the factual basis the officer articulated, then judged for objective reasonableness |
| Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant given the disturbance call and observation of a man leaving the house | The call plus temporal/spatial proximity to the house supported reasonable suspicion defendant was involved in criminal activity at the house | The facts did not support a reasonable inference defendant committed or threatened property damage or physical harm inside the house | Court held officers lacked reasonable suspicion—facts did not support an objectively reasonable inference defendant committed or was about to commit the identified crimes |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Cloman, 254 Or. 1 (Oregon 1969) (adopted reasonable-suspicion framework for investigative stops)
- State v. Valdez, 277 Or. 621 (Oregon 1977) (emphasized "specific and articulable facts" requirement)
- State v. Ehly, 317 Or. 66 (Oregon 1993) (stated officers must point to facts giving rise to an inference defendant committed a crime)
- State v. Lichty, 313 Or. 579 (Oregon 1992) (objective test of observable facts for reasonable suspicion)
- State v. Jacobus, 318 Or. 234 (Oregon 1994) (applied facts-plus-inferences test)
- State v. Belt, 325 Or. 6 (Oregon 1997) (review focuses on officer's testimony and whether facts support inference re: specific defendant and crime)
- State v. Watson, 353 Or. 768 (Oregon 2013) (explained evolution of reasonable-suspicion standard)
- State v. Holdorf, 355 Or. 812 (Oregon 2014) (stated officers must point to facts showing person has committed or is about to commit a crime; training/experience must be shown with specific facts)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. Supreme Court 1968) (foundation for investigative-stop doctrine)
- Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (U.S. Supreme Court 2009) (referenced regarding reasonable-suspicion language)