State v. M. Hotchkiss, 474 P.3d 1273

Matthew Hotchkiss pled guilty to felony sexual assault of his girlfriend’s 13‑year‑old daughter and to tampering with evidence after attempting to substitute urine during pretrial testing.
The District Court ordered a PSI and a psychosexual evaluation; the psychosexual evaluation recommended sex‑offender treatment and no unsupervised contact with minors.
The PSI proposed numerous probation conditions, including Conditions 36, 37, and 44: broad restrictions on internet access, prohibition/monitoring of computers and smart phones, installation of monitoring/rating software, random searches, prohibition on encryption/steganography, and turnover of passwords and phone/internet/utility records.
At sentencing the court imposed prison commitments (with substantial portions suspended), adopted the PSI tech‑related conditions, and ordered Hotchkiss to repay public defender costs.
Hotchkiss appealed, challenging (1) the tech/internet/device conditions as overbroad and lacking nexus to his offenses, and (2) the imposition of public defender costs without a meaningful inquiry into his ability to pay.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to (a) narrow and amend the tech conditions consistent with the opinion and (b) re‑determine Hotchkiss’s ability to pay the public defender fee.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Conditions 36, 37, 44 (banning/monitoring internet, computers, phones) were lawful	State: Conditions relate to protecting minors and monitoring compliance with other sex‑offender prohibitions; nexus exists to the offense	Hotchkiss: Conditions are overbroad, no nexus to his offense or history, and impede employment/education	Court: Conditions as imposed were overbroad; reversed and remanded to amend. Court endorsed narrower monitoring (ban on concealment/encryption, authorization for installs/searches/monitoring, access to records) while permitting legitimate internet use for employment/education.
Whether court erred by ordering payment of public defender costs without adequate inquiry into ability to pay	State: Statute authorizes assessing public defender costs but requires a determination of ability to pay	Hotchkiss: Court made only cursory financial inquiry and failed to "scrupulously and meticulously" assess ability to pay	Court: Reversed and remanded—district court‘s inquiry was insufficient; must conduct a scrupulous, meticulous ability‑to‑pay inquiry and may assess partial costs accordingly.

State v. Melton, 364 Mont. 482, 276 P.3d 900 (Mont. 2012) (probation condition must have a nexus to the offense or offender; undue breadth reversible)
State v. Nauman, 376 Mont. 326, 334 P.3d 368 (Mont. 2014) (distinguishes legality review from discretionary review of probation conditions)
State v. Conley, 391 Mont. 164, 415 P.3d 473 (Mont. 2018) (probation’s purposes are rehabilitation and community protection; probationers have reduced privacy expectations)
State v. Roper, 305 Mont. 212, 26 P.3d 741 (Mont. 2001) (probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy permitting some intrusion)
State v. Gable, 380 Mont. 101, 354 P.3d 566 (Mont. 2015) (courts must "scrupulously and meticulously" inquire into ability to pay court‑imposed costs)
State v. Reynolds, 390 Mont. 58, 408 P.3d 503 (Mont. 2017) (ability‑to‑pay findings are factual and reviewed for clear error)
State v. Robertson, 381 Mont. 75, 364 P.3d 580 (Mont. 2015) (deferential review of probation conditions; nexus standard explained)