172 A.3d 156
R.I.2017Background
- On Aug. 6, 2014, Luke P. Peters (defendant) and others consumed alcohol; while a passenger in the back seat of a moving car, Peters jumped forward, grabbed the steering wheel, turned it, and caused the vehicle to leave the road and roll over, injuring two minors.
- Peters was charged in Superior Court with assault with a dangerous weapon; DUI resulting in serious bodily injury (§ 31-27-2.6); driving so as to endanger resulting in serious and nonserious bodily injury (§ 31-27-1.2); contributing to the delinquency of a minor; and driving with a revoked license (§ 31-11-18).
- A magistrate found probable cause to charge Peters with “operating” the vehicle; on appeal to a Superior Court justice, the judge concluded that tugging the wheel was not enough to constitute driving or operating under the cited statutes and granted a Rule 9.1 motion to dismiss counts 1–4 and 6.
- The State appealed the dismissals of counts charging violations of §§ 31-27-2.6, 31-27-1.2, and 31-11-18.
- The Supreme Court examined statutory definitions in G.L. 1956 § 31-1-17 (defining “driver” and “operator”) and the statutory scheme of chapter 27 to decide whether a passenger’s forcible grabbing/turning of the wheel can constitute "operating" or "driving."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Peters) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a passenger who forcibly seizes the steering wheel of a moving vehicle can be deemed an "operator"/"driver" under §§ 31-27-1.2, 31-27-2.6, and 31-11-18 | Grabbing and steering the wheel is actual physical control and therefore falls within the statutory definitions of operator/driver; supports prosecution under the cited statutes | Post-amendment readings and Capuano show the Legislature removed "actual physical control" from § 31-27-2(a) to require more than momentary or passive possession; momentary tugging is insufficient | Held for the State: forcible grabbing/steering of a moving vehicle can constitute "operating" under § 31-1-17 and supports prosecution under the cited statutes |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Reed, 764 A.2d 144 (discussing probable-cause review on a Rule 9.1 motion) (procedural standard)
- State v. Aponte, 649 A.2d 219 (probable-cause standard for info dismissal) (procedural standard)
- State v. Young, 941 A.2d 124 (trial justice must construe info package for probable cause; afford State inferences) (procedural standard)
- State v. Capuano, 591 A.2d 35 (interpreting deletion of "actual physical control" from DUI statute; mere possession or idling not operating) (distinguished)
- State v. Morris, 666 A.2d 419 (operation requires setting vehicle in motion; turning ignition on constituted operation) (distinguished)
- People v. Yamat, 714 N.W.2d 335 (grabbing/turning steering wheel causing vehicle to veer is operating) (persuasive out-of-state authority)
- State v. Rivera, 83 P.3d 69 (passenger grabbing wheel assumed actual physical control for DUI) (persuasive out-of-state authority)
