2015 NMCA 032
N.M. Ct. App.2015Background
- Defendant Nodee Lujan was arrested and charged (two counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor) on March 16, 2012; initial trial was set for October 16, 2012.
- Dispute over polygraph evidence: Defendant notified State in August 2012 he would use his polygraph results; State sought to compel another and later disclosed victim had taken a polygraph 12 days before trial; court denied State’s continuance and denied compelling Defendant to retake polygraph.
- State dismissed charges the day before the October 2012 trial and refiled identical charges eight days later; Defendant pleaded not guilty in May 2013 and trial was set for October 15, 2013.
- Defendant moved to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds in July 2013; after an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the motion and dismissed with prejudice; State appealed.
- The State conceded the delay was presumptively prejudicial and largely attributable to the State, but argued some delay was caused by Defendant and that Defendant failed to timely assert his speedy-trial right.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Lujan) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the post-arrest delay violated the Sixth Amendment / New Mexico speedy-trial right | Delay should not weigh heavily against State because some delay was caused by Defendant and some delays were beyond either party’s control; Defendant did not timely assert the right | Delay measured from arrest to trial setting (≈19 months); State’s dismissal/refiling was intentional and caused unnecessary delay; prejudice was undue | Court affirmed dismissal: Barker factors weigh for Defendant — delay and prejudice favor Defendant; reasons for delay weigh heavily against State |
| Proper measure of delay duration | Count delay until Defendant filed motion to dismiss (shorter period) | Count delay through refiling and to scheduled trial/dismissal (longer period) | Court counts to trial setting/dismissal; found ~19 months (seven months beyond presumptive threshold) |
| Weight to assign to reasons for delay (State’s dismissal/refiling; polygraph dispute) | State’s actions were reasonable responses to late disclosures and trial issues; some delays were administrative or mutual | State’s dismissal/refiling to avoid trial after its late motions was deliberate and foreseeable; courts should weigh deliberate delay heavily against State | Court found primary reason was deliberate delay by State and weighed that heavily against the State |
| Whether Defendant properly asserted speedy-trial right | Defendant filed motion to dismiss (asserted remedy, not right); waited too long, so this factor should weigh against Defendant | Motion to dismiss is an assertion of the speedy-trial right and was timely (filed months before trial); did not cause delay | Court treated motion to dismiss as a valid assertion of the right and weighted this factor slightly in Defendant’s favor |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (establishes four-factor balancing test for speedy-trial claims)
- Garza v. State, 146 N.M. 499 (N.M. 2009) (adopts Barker balancing and discusses tension between speed and fairness)
- Spearman v. State, 283 P.3d 272 (N.M. 2012) (applies Barker factors and sets presumptive delay thresholds)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (U.S. 1992) (defines triggering ‘‘presumptively prejudicial’’ delay concept)
- Salandre v. State, 111 N.M. 422 (N.M. 1991) (discusses anxiety/prejudice component of speedy-trial right)
- Work v. State, 111 N.M. 145 (N.M. 1990) (recognizes motion to dismiss as an assertion of the speedy-trial right)