State v. Lucero, 2017 NMSC 8

Background

Infant Laticia May Lucero ("Baby") died at 47 days old; autopsy showed catastrophic blunt‑force brain injuries and multiple healing fractures inconsistent with normal handling. Medical experts testified the injuries would have produced immediate and obvious impairment.
Mother left Baby in Defendant Jadrian Lucero’s care on June 9, 2010; Defendant later called that Baby was "not breathing." Defendant gave post‑death statements to police; he denied hurting Baby but suggested accidental or alternative caretakers may have caused injuries.
A Cibola County grand jury indicted Defendant for intentional child abuse resulting in death (NMSA 1978, § 30‑6‑1(D)). The State’s theory was that Defendant inflicted the fatal injuries; the defense argued the injuries predated his care.
At trial the court gave UJI 14‑602 with UJI 14‑610 (defining "intentionally" as purposely doing an act); the instruction included two alternatives: endangerment or torture/cruel punishment. Defense counsel did not object to those instructions.
Jury convicted Defendant; he was sentenced to life. Post‑verdict, the court received an email purporting to be from a juror saying they had convicted for neglect rather than murder; Defendant moved for a new trial and for an evidentiary hearing to question jurors, which the district court denied under Rule 11‑606(B).
On appeal Defendant argued (1) the jury instructions misstated the mens rea for intentional child‑endangerment by failing to require intent to harm and (2) the denial of a juror‑inquiry hearing was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether jury instructions improperly defined "intentionally" for child‑abuse by endangerment	The UJI tracked the statute and was presumptively correct; evidence and State theory showed intentional violent abuse, so no risk of conviction on an innocuous intentional act	The instruction allowed conviction if Defendant committed any intentional act that later produced danger, even if he lacked intent or knowledge of resulting harm	Court held instructions were legally sufficient and not fundamentally erroneous given the statutory language, the UJI presumption of correctness, and the trial evidence showing intentional violent abuse
Whether trial court abused discretion by denying an evidentiary hearing into the juror email	The email was not admissible under Rule 11‑606(B); the court could not verify authorship, the email did not allege extraneous prejudicial information, and Defendant declined the court's offer to poll the jury	The email showed jurors convicted on negligence rather than intentional abuse, violating unanimity and entitling Defendant to voir dire and a new trial	Court held denial was not an abuse of discretion: Rule 11‑606(B) bars inquiry into deliberations absent narrow exceptions, none applied; Sena and related authority support denial

Key Cases Cited

State v. Cabezuela, 150 N.M. 654 (2011) (instructs omission of "failure to act" language when pursuing intentional child‑abuse theory)
Santillanes v. State, 115 N.M. 215 (1993) (child‑abuse requires at least morally contemptible conduct; negligent standard differs)
State v. Consaul, 332 P.3d 850 (2014) (reversal where State changed inconsistent theories during trial)
State v. Schoonmaker, 105 P.3d 302 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (discussed uniform instruction use in negligent child‑abuse context; not controlling for intentional endangerment)
State v. Sena, 736 P.2d 491 (1987) (Rule 11‑606(B) bars juror‑testimony inquiries absent specified exceptions)
State v. Ortega, 327 P.3d 1076 (2014) (uniform jury instructions are presumed correct)